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editor's note Crisis planning is, by its very nature, a paradoxical expression of the plan-
ning process. As planning professionals, we are accused of short-sightedness
in the wake of community emergencies. This challenge to our purpose is, of
course, familiar. We are accused of short-sightedness in our most routine zon-
ing reviews. The planner's dilemma? Indeed, we are prisoners of necessity
and captives of precaution.
For the most part, the conflict associated with crisis planning and emergency
planning is related to the frailties of the "long-range comprehensive process"
which characterizes our mission. It is a conflict empowered and crippled by
politics; a conflict of financial and social priorities. The "long-range" is dis-
counted as a frivilous and unknowable perspective. "There is so much to be
done now. . .", the public bureaucracy cries, "how can we afford the luxury
of a disaster plan?" Luxury becomes necessity only in the aftermath. The
disaster provides for itself. Community response to life-threatening emergen-
cies provides a context for future planning. In many cases, however, the un-
wanted education of one community is rarely exchanged with cities and towns
still waiting their turn.
In this issue of Carolina planning, some of the lessons of disaster and
emergency planning are discussed. In two articles, researchers at the Center
for Urban and Regional Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill describe hurricane planning and development management efforts of
disaster-prone coastal communities. The process of reconstruction and the
planning strategies which some of these regions have adopted to mitigate the
costs of severe storms are recounted by Hegenbarth /Brower and Beatley/
Godschalk with unexpected conclusions. In a related piece by Kartez et al.,
western cities subject to periodic disasters (earthquakes, flooding, hazardous
technology failures, etc.) are surveyed to determine the extent of their pre-
paredness. In all three articles, substantive recommendations are made to in-
spire improved emergency planning efforts in local communities.
Contributions by Dusenbury and Gelblum balance the issue with more
traditional planning concerns. Dusenbury reviews the history of the Regional
Coastal Commission and critiques its weak commitment to regional plan-
ning. Gelblum considers the role of planners in community dispute resolu-
tion; concerns of political planning.
As a whole, this issue explores the contradictions of long-range planning
relative to the divergent public investment goals, political priorities, and
technical capacities of local communities. It is an attempt to assemble the work
of planners concerned with the extremes of community planning and develop-
ment. As we share the experience of planning extremes, our local and more
immediate actions are expanded and enhanced. The long-range plan is made
real from historical events and human response.
Ted Olin Harrison
Editor
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In the Works
Planning for Water Quality in the Coastal Zone Kathleen Leyden
Water quality management regulations in the
State of North Carolina have traditionally been ad-
ministered by various state agencies including the
Department of Environmental Management (DEM
permits for surface water discharges and ground-
water regulations), the Division of Health Services
(large sewage disposal systems), and by local govern-
ments (local health department permits for septic
systems and land use planning regulations that ad-
dress watershed protection). In North Carolina's
coastal zone, land use planning for the protection
of water quality has been addressed at the state level
since 1979. Sedimentation controls and limitations
on impervious surfaces along estuarine shorelines
were imposed by the Coastal Area Management Act
(CAMA). A broader initiative was needed, however.
In response the Division of Coastal Management
(DCM) and the Coastal Resources Commission
(CRC) agreed that coastal water quality and, in par-
ticular, the impact of non-point source pollution on
coastal waters should be the priority issue for the
1985 agency work program.
In order to identify water quality problems on the
coast, and to obtain public input on the issues, a
series of "Roundtable" discussions were held during
October, November and December of 1984 at three
locations on the coast. Nearly 200 people represent-
ing a broad diversity of interests including local
governments, industries, and environmental groups
participated in the forums. Uncharacteristic of many
participatory events, attendance at each subsequent
meeting grew. The discussions sought to derive
useful recommendations for the DCM and the CRC,
and did not involve heated debates over the mechan-
ics of regulatory controls.
A broad objective of the work groups was that
water quality planning should achieve a balance be-
tween development, agriculture and fisheries, while
still providing for economic development on the
coast and the protection of the coast's more tradi-
tional uses. The water quality problems deemed of
critical importance were ranked in order of prior-
ity by the representatives of each coastal region
(North, Central and South). Recommendations for
waste research, education and management strate-
gies were made for each issue. Priority concerns
among Roundtable participants were non-point
source pollution, groundwater management, basin-
wide pollutant loading, coastal development densities,
citizen education, cumulative impacts of development,
waste disposal, wetland loss and comprehensive
management of water resources.
One of the more innovative recommendations
made by the Roundtable representatives involved
devising a methodology which would monitor the
cumulative effect of development in a drainage basin
as it occurs over time. The fact that water quality
impacts from development are presently regulated
on a permit-by-permit basis was considered a critical
problem. Under a "regional threshold" concept, per-
mits for new development might be issued on the
basis of projected growth patterns and resource
needs. Additional research and modeling in the area
of land use/water quality relationships would be
necessary to carry out this initiative.
Many of the Roundtable groups' recommenda-
tions call for increased funding for projects by the
state legislature. One such recommendation is for
the expansion of the cost-sharing program adminis-
tered by the Division of Soil and Water Conserva-
tion in "nutrient sensitive" watersheds. The focus of
the program is the reduction of non-point source
pollutants through the use of "best management
practices" (grassed waterways, filter strips, no-till
farming, etc) on agricultural lands. The cost-sharing
program covers 75% of the cost of a participating
farmer's project. Currently, only the Falls Lake, Jordan
Lake and the Chowan River watersheds are designated
as "nutrient sensitive". Expansion of the program
watersheds would positively affect coastal water
quality.
One of the more controversial issues addressed
at the Roundtable series involved the limitation of
development densities in the coastal zone. Although
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local governments take the lead in controlling densi-
ties, the Roundtable participants suggested that the
CRC could have considerable influence in this area
by strengthening its guidelines through the land use
planning process. Under the provisions of CAMA,
localities in North Carolina's coastal zone are required
to prepare land use plans according to guidelines set
by, and subject to the approval of the Division of
Coastal Management and the CRC.
Coordination with other government agencies is
one of the most difficult obstacles to the develop-
ment of reasonable water quality and land use stan-
dards. The implementation of those regulations is
the next worst problem. The CRC has taken an ag-
gressive stance on water quality issues by adopting
a schedule to address the Roundtable series recom-
mendations. Non-point source pollution and storm-
water runoff have since been addressed and DCM
staff anticipate that new standards will be in place
by late summer 1985. However, achieving the goals
outlined in the participatory process will involve a
cooperative effort with DEM, the Environmental
Management Commission and funding sources.
The complete summary of the Coastal Roundtable
Series is available from the Division of Coastal Man-
agement, NC DNRCD, RO. Box 27687, Raleigh,
N.C. 27611-7687 (919-733-2293).
Opening Closed Doors:
Worker-Ownership Initiatives Carol B. Solow
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Planners in states and regions where plant clos-
ings have had a devastating impact on the economic
and social health of their communities are struggling
to develop viable long-term job creation and reten-
tion strategies. Worker-ownership is one strategy
that has gained recognition as an effective economic
development program for some communities. Suc-
cessful models for regional economic cooperatives
remain, however, relatively undeveloped. An exem-
plary and potentially replicable model for economic
development planners is the worker-ownership sup-
port agency network in North Carolina.
In North Carolina, over 14,184 jobs in 101 plants,
primarily textile and furniture-based, were lost in
1984 due to shutdowns. A number of organizations
are responding to this crisis of dislocated labor by
providing intensive financial management, educa-
tional, and organizational development assistance
to existing and emerging cooperatives. As a result
of coordinated efforts, over one dozen worker-
owned businesses, ranging in size from three to fifty
employees, are currently operating throughout the
state.
The organizations promoting worker-ownership
in North Carolina are commited to worker-owner-
ship as an economic development tool and as a
means of extending decision-making roles to a wide
range of labor participants. A support network has
developed from the shared efforts of these organiza-
tions. Their primary work has involved small busi-
ness management and financial technical assistance.
It is complemented by on-going education and train-
ing in interpersonal dynamics and group decision-
making. Since 1980, the Durham-based Center for
Community Self-Help has been instrumental in de-
veloping both types of assistance.
A Worker-Ownership Development Model
The Center for Community Self-Help was formed
in 1980, by Martin Eakes, with the goal of facilitat-
ing grassroots economic development in North
Carolina. The Center was designed to provide tech-
nical assistance, community education, and policy
and financing mechanisms appropriate for small
scale development assistance. Today, the Center and
the Self-Help Credit Union are instrumental compo-
nents of the state's worker-ownership support
system.
The Center responds to requests from existing co-
operatives, community members interested in creat-
ing jobs, and business proprietors proposing to sell
their companies to employees. The many tasks asso-
ciated with organizing a worker-ownership enter-
prise are frequently intimidating. Worker-ownership
is often thwarted by the legal and financial require-
ments of the process. To mitigate these concerns,
consultants are assigned to assist groups in preparing
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Space Builders— a worker owned design & construction firm.
business plans and finance packages for lenders.
Staff members work with the business consultants
to ensure the project's effective planning. Technical
assistance is also provided as cooperatives evolve
from the planning to operative stages. The staff ad-
vises the incorporation process and provides on-site
training. Most training focuses on group decision-
making and conflict management.
Among the most difficult constraints on worker-
ownership development involves the acquisition of
sufficient and appropriate sources of financing. Tra-
ditional lending institutions often prove unwilling
and/or unable to offer reasonable loans to fledgling
firms. In response, the Center formed the Self-Help
Credit Union in January 1984 to provide an alterna-
tive source of funding for worker-ownership proj-
ects. To date, the Center has successfully marketed
the Credit Union as a way for churches, founda-
tions, and individuals to support community eco-
nomic development through loans to North Caro-
lina cooperatives and democratically-managed
businesses.
After less than two years, the Credit Union has
secured over $4.2 million in deposits. A recent boost
to the assets of the Credit Union is an agreement
with the North Carolina State Employees Credit
Union to enable state employees to make deposits
to the Self-Help Credit Union through the State Em-
ployee Credit Union branch offices. State Credit
Unions are one example of the type of resources that
community economic development planners can
access.
The movement to socially responsible investment
by institutions and individuals is gaining attention
throughout the country. The development of a state
worker-ownership credit union is a feasible tool to
transform social investment commitment into re-
gional grassroots job-creation capital.
Coordination with Additional Resources
The Center for Community Self-Help and the
Self-Help Credit Union are key organizations in
North Carolina, but they alone do not provide the
full range of skills and assistance that economic de-
velopment for worker-ownership requires. Other or-






The Brief Life and Hard Times of the
Coastal Plains Regional Commission
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Pat Dusenbury
Dusenbury's history of the Coastal Plains Regional Commission highlights the contributions made by
this federally-funded economic development agency as well as traces the steps to its federally-ordered abolition.
Her thorough description of the agency's demise dismisses the possibility of drawing the most obvious, but
inaccurate, conclusion — that regional economic development planning is ineffective. Rather, this agency's






The Coastal Plains Regional Commission (CPRC)
was one of five regional commissions established in
July of 1967 under Title V of the Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965. Its territory en-
compassed the coastal area of several southern states
inland to the beginning of the Piedmont. The Com-
mission's purpose was to accelerate economic devel-
opment in the Coastal Plains Region, to reduce the
extensive poverty and to raise the income levels of
the people living there. Governors of the member
states plus a federal co-chairman appointed by the
President made up the Commission. Within a year,
the CPRC was staffed and functioning.
Just fourteen years later, in July 1981, the bell
tolled for CPRC as President Reagan's proposed
abolition of the Title V Regional Commissions be-
came law. This was not the first attempt to do away
with the Title V Commissions. Eight years earlier,
President Nixon had made a similar but unsuccessful
proposal. The outcome was different in 1981.
Once the end of the Title V Commissions was
mandated, the CPRC acted quickly. All but a skele-
ton staff retained to close down the Commission
were given notice. Most on-going CPRC projects
were terminated, and the Commerce Department
took over those few projects that were not at a point
where they could be closed out. Some of the remain-
ing Fiscal Year 1981 funds were allocated for an eval-
uation of the Coastal Plains Regional Commission.
As part of the Southern Growth Policies Board staff
at that time, I participated in the study. This article
describes the Commission's history in terms of its
effect on coastal policy, and attempts to assess its
work relative to future coastal regional planning
efforts.
Coastal Plains Regional Commission Goals
The Public Works and Economic Development
Act of 1965 includes the following statement of
purpose:
to provide grants for public works and devel-
opment facilities, other financial assistance
and the planning and coordination needed to
alleviate conditions of substantial and persis-
tent unemployment and underemployment in
economically distressed areas and regions.
Passed as part of the War on Poverty, the Act em-
bodied the political belief that the federal govern-
ment should work with states to encourage develop-
ment in areas with economic problems. Title V of
the Act was an expression of faith in the value of
a regional approach to problems that crossed state
lines — both for action and planning. Inspired by the
success of the Appalachian Regional Commission,
it authorized the Secretary of Commerce to desig-
nate interstate areas of lagging economic develop-
ment as economic development regions, and with
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North Carolina beach development
the states, to establish regional action planning com-
missions in those areas. The Title V Commissions
were to (1) provide an interstate mechanism for
planning, technical assistance, and demonstration
projects; and (2) channel federal economic develop-
ment funds into their regions.
The Coastal Plains Regional Commission ex-
pressed the same goal throughout its fourteen years.
The first annual report noted that residents of the
Coastal Plains area had a per capita income more
than $1,000 below the national average. "To reduce
and eventually eliminate this gap is the fundamental
goal of the commission partnership." Encouraging
economic development was seen as the means for
achieving that goal. While the Commission goal
came to be expressed in more detail, the intent re-
mained the same. The last annual report stated:
These then are the goals of the Coastal Plains
Regional Commission:
1. To give the people of the region greater op-
portunities to find employment at the
highest level of their capabilities.
2. To help individuals bring their skills to
higher levels of competence.
3. To provide increased opportunities for indi-
viduals to earn higher incomes.
4. To help communities provide those services
that enhance their economic potential.
Coastal Plains Regional Commission
Programs
Within its geographic boundaries, the CPRC pro-
vided funds for technical assistance and supplemen-
tal grants as defined by Sections 505 and 509 of the
enabling legislation. Section 505 funds financed
technical assistance for economic development pro-
grams. Eligible activities included planning, research,
studies, and demonstration projects, including the
construction of public facilities. Section 509 author-
ized supplemental grants to help state and local
governments leverage federal grants from other
sources. The premise behind the supplemental grants
was that insufficient local resources prevented the
neediest places from participating in the numerous
federal grant programs that required some local
matching funds. Originally, the Coastal Plains
region encompassed 159 counties in Georgia and the
Carolinas. It was expanded in 1975 to include east-
ern Virginia and northern Florida, again in 1976
when 50 more counties in Georgia and South Caro-











During the early years of the CPRC, regional
development planning commanded a large share of
the Commission's resources and produced sophisti-
cated economic plans for the leading sectors of the
region's economy. Those plans, which were formally
endorsed by the member states, supplied a clear
sense of direction for CPRC activities even though
the program areas addressed by CPRC, like the
regional boundaries, evolved over time.
Initial CPRC priority areas were industrial devel-
opment, supportive facilities and services and policy
development. A variety of programs were subsumed
under those headings. For example, industrial
development projects included general industry,
agriculture and forestry, marine industries, travel
and tourism. Program areas were incrementally
modified and expanded during the early years of the
Commission; and then in Fiscal Year 1974, in response
to the presidential attempt on the Commission's life,
there was a major reorganization. Transportation,
health, housing, and human resources programs
were discontinued. The more job-related programs
were retained and divided among five major pro-
gram categories — industrial development, marine
resources, agriculture and forestry, environmental
affairs, and travel industry development — a struc-
ture that persisted until the Commission was dis-
mantled in 1981.
Post-Reorganization Regionalism
The CPRC regional planning function was weak-
ened by the 1974 reorganization but survived in the
work of its advisory committees, which were ap-
pointed by the Governors in each program area, and
of the CPRC staff. Because the advisory commit-
tees included people from the public sector,
academia, and the business community in all the
member states, they provided the CPRC a forum
for both interstate and public-private cooperation.
The advisory committees concentrated on regional
programs, developing projects and acting as ad-
vocates for them in the review process.
Each advisory committee submitted a written an-
nual report setting forth (1) economic development
priorities for their program area; (2) possible courses
of action relating to those priorities; and (3)
resources — national and regional, public and
private — that could be used to address the priorities.
CPRC staff supported the advisory committees by
helping them monitor trends, define problems, con-
sider alternative responses, and where appropriate,
prepare proposals for projects. Projects involving
just one state were referred to that state; projects
involving two or more CPRC states were considered
regional projects and proposed to the Commission.
Regional projects had to submit to a vast maze
of reviews and approvals. First, the advisory com-
mittee submitted a proposal to the Commission
itself; that is, the Governors and the federal co-
chairman. If the review was favorable, the proposal
was sent back to the Advisory Committee, which,
with the help of CPRC staff, developed a formal ap-
plication for funding that was submitted to the
CPRC. The federal co-chairman then sought ap-
proval from the parent agency, the Department of
Commerce. Only projects that survived this review
were eligible for funding. Final funding decisions
were made through a hierarchical budgetary pro-
cess. After administrative costs were covered and
funds set aside for state development planning,
money was allocated to regional projects, and then
the remaining money was divided equally among
the member states for state economic development
projects in their CPRC counties.
As a regional economic development agency, the
Coastal Plains Regional Commission occupied a
tenuous position between the federal government
and the states. The importance of planning in this
position is revealed by the history of the CPRC as
it allowed its plans to run out. After the Fiscal Year
1974 reorganization, the CPRC devoted few re-
sources to planning; it was no longer an ongoing
activity. The advisory committees and the staff did
some planning, but mostly, they followed the plans
produced in the earlier days of the Commission.
Once the ideas and projects from those plans had
been implemented or discarded, the advisory com-
mittees — reflecting the Commission itself — lacked a
clear sense of direction and were reduced to simply
passing through federal funds to the member states.
The existence of a comprehensive development
plan endorsed by the states had protected the CPRC
from state raids on its funds. But as the plans aged,
it became harder to justify regional projects, and a
growing share of CPRC funds was simply divided
among the member states to become in the words
of one disaffected ex-employee, "a governors' slush
fund."
Budget trends describe the transition of the CPRC
from a regional economic development agency to
a conduit for federal funds. In the late seventies, the
share of the budget going for regional projects
dropped precipitously. Several regional projects were
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divided up among the states to implement as they
chose. Problems were most severe in the area of en-
vironmental affairs, which as a post-1974 program
area had no comprehensive plan to guide its activi-
ties and was beset by conflicting opinions about its
mission.
The CPRC was undermined further by the 1977
indictment of the federal co-chairman on charges
of conspiracy and conflict of interest. Although he
later won an appeal of the verdict, the CPRC's credi-
bility was irreversibly damaged.
Decline and Fall
The final decline of the CPRC can be traced
through the fortunes of its advisory committees,
which along with the staff, were advocates for the
regional aspect of the CPRC programs. When the
regional approach was downplayed after the Fiscal
Year 1974 reorganization, the advisory committees
gradually became less productive. For a few years,
they could proceed on the basis of the planning done
in the early years of the Commission, but when
those plans were not updated, the advisory commit-
tees floundered. Essentially, the advisory committees
supported the CPRC as long as the Commission
supported them.
The diminishing productivity of the advisory
committees frustrated their active members, and that
frustration was aggravated by the multi-layered ap-
proval process which had no provision for explana-
tions or other feedback when a project was rejected.
Moreover, the budget process itself mitigated against
funding regional projects. The complexity of the ap-
proval procedures allowed a lack of accountability
for decisions, which undermined the whole process
further. To be effective, the advisory committees
needed plans that they could not produce them-
selves. They needed plans to guide and then to
justify project proposals. Those plans needed to bear
the imprimature of the Commission itself— the
governors, not just their appointees.
The Fiscal Year 1974 reorganization was a re-
sponse to diminishing federal support for regional
economic development, but it was also a statement
of priorities for the resources that the Commission
did command. The advisory committees and the
CPRC staff felt the impacts of weakening the re-
gional focus first: the staff was charged with getting
the money out to the states with less emphasis on
fostering regional economic develoment, the states
set their own project priorities, while the ever-
expanding CPRC boundaries reduced the geograph-
ic limits on state spending decisions; the advisory
committees, which were the structural expression of
regionalism, became ineffective. After the CPRC lost
its regional perspective, it lost its raison d'etre.
When President Reagan proposed doing away
with the Title V Commissions, there was little resist-
ance in the Coastal Plains Region. The CPRC was
much less than had been envisioned originally and
so weakened by state intrusions that few people pro-
tested. Rather than say that the Reagan Adminis-
tration killed CPRC, it is probably more accurate
to say that it just removed the corpse.
Post Mortum
The Coastal Plains Regional Commission did not
disappear without a trace. Several projects spon-
sored by the CPRC during its short lifetime endure
as does the information in numerous CPRC-spon-
sored studies. Brick and mortar monuments to the
CPRC include the marine resource centers, which
attract tourists and are especially beloved by parents
who encounter bad weather at the beach. There are
the more prosaic monuments, water and sewer
systems in the Coastal Plains Region built thanks
to matching grants through the CPRC. Impossible
to measure but none the less important, is the con-
tribution of CPRC to interstate cooperation in
economic development efforts. Residents of coastal
states who worked together on advisory commit-
tees still share the common interest and concerns
they addressed together as committee members.
The history of the CPRC, like history in general,
contains lessons for the present. It is important to
take a close look at what occurred to avoid what
may be the most obvious but also inaccurate con-
clusion, that regional economic development plan-
ning does not work. A closer look reveals an
economic development planning agency that lost its
commitment to planning, even in its own activities.
The CPRC, as it existed in 1981, had replaced plan-
ning with simply trying to stay alive; it deserved to
die. It would be unfortunate and unfair if the con-
cept of interstate planning is discredited by CPRC's
brief life. The Coastal Plains Regional Commission
has gone away, but the need for interstate ap-
proaches to economic development, human re-
sources, and resource management endures along








Sharing Emergency Planning Assumptions
Management Views Differ
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Effective disaster management requires advanced planning. News media centers, public information hot-lines,
and on-site volunteer procedures must be established in anticipation of large scale emergencies.
In the following article, Kartez reviews the disaster planning programs and policies of 250 public agencies
associated with disaster-prone communities. The study describes managerial perspectives of disaster planning
policy. The article is a guide for planners concerned with the complexities of community crisis mitigation.
community disaster
planning
A frequent finding of research on disasters is the
need for local government to anticipate how the
community reacts to a large scale crisis. Commu-
nity disaster plans do not always acknowledge that
the independent actions which citizens, news media
and other agencies take are factors that management
must anticipate. For example, at a recent airline
crash in Louisiana that killed 154 people and
demolished a neighborhood, fire-fighters command-
ing the scene were overwhelmed by spectators and
would-be helpers whose presence was triggered by
inaccurate media reports. This problem of "con-
vergence behavior" has been observed in disasters
for almost three decades, but public managers are
often caught by surprise. Perry (1979) has called pre-
disaster use of this kind of insight "research-based
community disaster planning." Through this ap-
proach, local officials can "work with people's
known reaction patterns" and avoid "making admin-
istratively devised plans that potentially create more
problems than they solve" (1979: 446).
Implementation Problems
Transfer of this planning philosophy to local prac-
tice has not been as rapid as many would like. After
a nationwide International City Management Asso-
ciation analysis of local planning in 1982, the study's
director complained that:
What is puzzling is, that after years of research
on organizational behavior in disasters, local
government continues to be surprised when
the standard operating procedures in their
lengthy, detailed response plans turn out to be
irrelevant in the disaster (Hoetmer 1984: 1).
If researchers' suggestions for local government had
little real utility in the event, the above complaint
would not be very important. However, such is not
the case. Imagine, for example, you had been a key
administrator in Wichita Falls, Texas, during its
devastating 1979 tornado. 1 In addition to wrestling
with obvious demands for treating casualties, restor-
ing services and so on, you would have found
yourself making totally unplanned decisions to meet
needs like these:
— Appointing the City Attorney to organize
a news media information center;
— Assigning firefighters to hand-deliver a
"disaster newsletter" to neighborhoods in the
days before phones were restored;
— Running a city-staffed information "hot-
line" for citizen needs when phones were
restored; and
— Designating a single staff member to cope
with the continuous appearance of unoffi-
cial volunteer help and fit them into the
overall response.
This is an account of work supported by National
Science Foundation grant 8217550. The views ex-
pressed are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect the opinions of the Foundation.
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Volunteers prepare sandbags to hold back the flood waters Ravel! Call
These unplanned strategies of community organiza-
tion are very similar to those suggested by research
on disaster planning needs, and other studies of ac-
tual disaster response have made similar findings
(Drabek et al. 1981; Kartez 1984). None of these ac-
tions were planned, and often on-the-spot adaptive
planning is difficult if not impossible. Clearly
research suggestions do have potential utility to local
government. To not respond to these demands of
community behavior results in emergency decision
centers jammed with newsmen (Coalinga in 1983);
confused citizens trying to sort "news" and rumor
from vital instructions (Mt. St. Helens in 1980); and
volunteers duplicating or interfering with the efforts
of public agencies (Louisiana air crash). At the very
least, needed resources can be overlooked because
planning did not anticipate the sheer numbers of adaptive planning
people that are involved in a community-wide crisis.
Management Opinion Survey
The principal question guiding our research asks:
Do top managers in local fire, police, public works
and executive departments consider it important and
feasible to anticipate and plan for these aspects of
disaster events? Despite the several decades of
research recommendations and case studies, there questioning its
is surprisingly little knowledge of how the poten- importance
tial users of research view this question. To explore
it, we asked the heads of emergency-relevant depart-
ments in 80 California, Washington and Utah
localities to evaluate the effectiveness of three
12 Carolina planning
"research-based" strategies for meeting community
demands.
These examples have been "adaptively" planned
planning for in the heat of emergencies (Kartez 1982) as well as
social demands offered in the research literature. They included: 1)
anticipating the predictable appearance of unofficial
citizen helpers with an "Untrained Volunteer Plan",
2) preparing for the onslaught of large numbers of
radio and TV personnel with a "Media Information
Center" plan, and: 3) maintaining the capability to




Convergence of Helpers: Citizens
flock to disaster, both as sources of help and
as spectators who obstruct lifesaving
operations.
SUGGESTED PLANNING STRATEGY:
Untrained Volunteer Plan: Pre-desig-
nate one public agency to be responsible for
expecting these citizen actions and to ac-
tively give direction to volunteerism.
Media Overload: The news media is
the chief means of rapid communication
with the public, but often overwhelming
numbers of outside newspeople cause inac-
curacies and physically obstruct operations.
Media Information Center: Create
incentives for the media to use accurate
information. Plan for a central location
where media will be given frequent face-to-
face information from credible officials.
Mass Public Information: Citizens
can overwhelm agencies with demands for
instructions in the critical first days of
response, jamming switchboards and dis-
tracting key agencies. However, the public
needs a source of confirmatory information.
Disaster Information Hotline: Ar-
range in advance for the capability to oper-
ate and staff phone bank staffed by per-
sonnel who will give citizens vital instruc-
tions on protective actions, squelch rumors
and ease pressures on other agencies to
answer citizen demands for information.
Disaster Resources: Needs for physi-
cal resources often outstrip local capability.
Public agencies have to make simultaneous
decisions on committing public funds as op-
portunities for help appear, with no time
for observing routine business practices.
Emergency Resource Rules: Speed
procurement of special resources or person-
nel by prespecifying streamlined authoriza-
tion procedures for all departments that
may have emergency resource needs.
ample, a "Phone Hotline" plan. A fourth strategy
of a strictly internal, administrative nature was also
included for the purpose of comparing opinions:
adopting "Emergency Resource Rules"— that is,
authorizing local agencies in advance to bend
normal administrative procedures for procuring
needed resources in a disaster. These four examples
are further described in Table 1.
We asked managers in three earthquake-prone
metropolitan regions — the San Francisco Bay area,
Washington's Puget Sound basin, and Utah's Salt
Lake City area — to participate in this study. Cities
and counties in these areas were considered to be
administrative decisions
generally quite familiar with disaster planning needs.
The expectation was that this sample would allow
for an informed evaluation of the following ques-
tions: 1) Is there a perceived need to plan for the
"social" demands of disaster management? 2) Are
research-based strategies difficult to adopt and what
are their potential constraints? 3) Do factors like ex-
perience with disasters, involvement in the planning
process or jurisdiction size (a proxy for resources)
make any difference?
A total of 250 out of 300 managers replied to the
survey. Officials from public works (23%), fire
(22%), municipal police (18%), emergency services
(12%), sheriffs (6%) and executive departments
(8%) participated. An attempt was made to gain the
response of a cross-section of key managerial disci-
plines in each of the 80 jurisdictions. Over three-
quarters of the participants represented the top man-
agement positions of their respective local agencies.
The following discussion analyzes how public
managers view the need to plan, the feasibility of
and obstacles to the suggested planning actions, the
influence of contextual factors like experience and
planning involvement, and the implications for local
disaster planning practice. The results are also of in-
terest to us as planners because of the light it sheds
on some of the difficulties of planning for unfamiliar
and remote community crises.
It should be kept in mind, though, that disaster
response planning is quite unlike community land
use or development planning. The process revolves
around highly specialized line agencies, not commu-
nity interest groups and policy analysts. Decisions
on what to plan for are essentially administrative
in nature, not legislative. Fire, public health, police
and emergency medical agencies respond to well-
defined emergencies every day. However, in a disas-
ter, these same agencies often find their roles ex-
panded in unexpected ways because of the sudden
involvement of virtually every sector of the commu-
nity: individual citizens, voluntary groups, the news
media and so on.
The Need to Plan
How significant are some typical disaster response
demands in the eyes of public managers? A majority
viewed controlling crowds, giving citizens instruc-
tions and finding outside resources as somewhat ex-
treme problems (Table 2). Organizing volunteers
and meeting the news media's demands for informa-
tion were viewed as less troublesome. Bay Area
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managers facing long term earthquake risks, how-
ever, view most of these potential problems as more
significant than do their Washington State counter-
parts. Utah officials viewed only crowd control as
an extreme problem, in the wake of their massive
1983 flood fighting experience which involved thou-
sands of citizen volunteers.
Table 2
Managerial Views of Response Demands
Little or Some Great
PROBLEM AREA No Problem Problems Problems
Controlling Crowds
Washington' 18% 53% 29%
California 13% 52% 35%
Utah 28% 36% 36%
Organizing Volunteers
Washington 35% 40% 25%
California 22% 52% 26%
Utah 71% 29% 0%
Giving Citizens Instructions
Washington 27% 40% 33%
California 14% 42% 44%
Utah 64% 29% 7%
Media Info. Demands
Washington 38% 36% 16%
California 32% 41% 27%
Utah 78% 22% 0%
Finding Resources
Washington 25% 48% 27%
California 13% 43% 44%
Utah 57% 36% 7%
"Washington N = 98
California N = 137
Utah N = 14
Do managers see a need to plan in advance to
manage these problems? Table 3 shows the answer
is a qualified yes. A majority of the surveyed
managers agreed that meeting the demands of out-
side actors (volunteers, the media and citizen needs
for public information) will be quite difficult
without prior planning. However, all agreed that
meeting the need to find outside resources would
not be difficult because of internal, administrative
rules. Clearly, managers make a distinction between
the need for internal arrangements like "bending the
rules" and the external demands of working with
the community. The majority viewed external, com-
munity demands as nonroutine and requiring antic-
ipatory planning. The key question is to what extent
this planning is taking place or is viewed as feasi-
ble if not already under way.
Sharing Emergency Planning Assumptions
Most managers considered planning for these
demands somewhat feasible, if not already under
way in their jurisdictions. About one-third of all
California and Washington departments reported
the availability of emergency resource rules and
media information center arrangements, as shown
in Table 4. Fewer reported citizen volunteer plans
in place, and only 12% of the 250 departments re-
ported arrangements for public information hot-
lines. However, 40% to 50% viewed resource rules,
media centers and citizen volunteer plans as quite
likely to be developed in the future. It was only in
the case of hotlines that a sizeable number of depart-
ments foresaw little or no chance of adoption.
These findings have to be qualified, though. Con-
sistency between departmental opinions in the same
city or county varied a great deal. In many cases,
only one out of several departments reported the
Table 3
Difficulty of Meeting Disaster Demands
With No Pla:nning
Not Very Somewhat Much More




Washington 60% 28% 21%
California 58% 25% 27%
Utah 43% 29% 28%
Managing Volunteers
With No Volun. Plan
Washington 22% 21% 57%
California 16% 18% 66%




Washington 21% 29% 50%
California 11% 24% 65%




Washington 18% 22% 60%
California 15% 21% 64%
Utah 21% 36% 43%
formal incorporation of a given strategy in their
response plans. In other cases, different departments
in the same city or county reported adoption of dif-
ferent strategies. These inconsistencies illustrate one
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of community disaster response planning. Agencies
are used to responding to specific emergencies where
their expertise places them in fairly certain com-
mand of the situation (e.g. a fire or a major acci-
dent). In a community-wide emergency, however,
Table 4
Feasibility of Adopting Strategies: Individual Views
Little or 50-50 Good Already
STRATEGY: No Chance Chance Chance Adopted
Emergency Resource
Rules
Washington 6% 16% 50% 28%
California 4% 15% 46% 35%
Utah 7% 0% 36% 57%
Untrained Volunteer
Plan
Washington 20% 27% 39% 14%
California 15% 21% 44% 20%
Utah 0% 0% 14% 86%
Media Information
Center
Washington 12% 19% 39% 31%
California 11% 17% 40% 32%
Utah 7% 7% 22% 65%
Public Information
Hotline
Washington 27% 31% 30% 12%
California 33% 23% 31% 12%
Utah 14% 0% 36% 50%
every agency is responding at once. The commu-
nity and news media are heavily involved and, as
Lois McCoy of the National Search and Rescue
Association pointed out not long ago, what you get
is "apples, oranges and bananas all responding
together. . each to his or her special emergency."
Awareness by apples of what oranges have
planned for could be useful. For example, out of 54
departments reporting adoption of citizen volunteer
plans in this sample, only five were fire departments.
Fire departments need to know that plans exist,
however, for keeping citizen helpers from over-
whelming and distracting their personnel in a large
scale disaster — as was the case in the air crash inci-
dent described at the outset of this article. Similarly,
out of 31 departments reporting arrangements for
public information hotlines, only two were fire
departments. Even in some smaller emergencies, fire
dispatch personnel are often overwhelmed with calls
from the public. Thus, provisions for steering calls
away from essential communications in a major
disaster can have benefits for first-response agencies
like fire departments. The point here is that in a
major disaster, a great number of citizens will be
seeking information on what protective actions to
take. They cannot be ignored. Awareness of the total
disaster planning strategy, however, is often
overlooked because of the greater immediacy of each
agencies' day-to-day approach to their own routine
emergency responsibilities.
Explaining Patterns of Adoption
Even though individual departments are not often
aware of the specialized plans that have been made
for a major community disaster, the patterns of
reported adoption of our four strategies illustrated
some important influences at the jurisdictional level:
experience, size and a tendency to build on the
familiar before investing in new methods. Tables 5
and 6 illustrate the role of experience in adopting
what managers rated as the less feasible and less
familiar strategies: citizen volunteer plans and public
information hotlines. Jurisdictions where no depart-
ments have experience with these problems were
highly unlikely to have any departments reporting
adoption of either strategy. In the case of size, it was
found that jurisdictions with populations over
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Disaster) 29% 71% 100% (24)
No Departments
Report Experience 36% 64% 100% (11)
TOTAL 48% 52% 100% (77)
tion of each of the strategies than were smaller
jurisdictions. This probably points out the role of
greater resources in allowing specialization to meet
such needs. Of course, smaller communities also
face a need to deal with community volunteers and
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One or More Depart-
ments Have Disaster
Experience 64% 36% 100% (25)
One or More Depart-
ments Have Emer-
gency Experience
(But Not Disaster) 63% 37% 100% (8)
No Departments
Report Experience 11% 89% 100% (44)
TOTAL 34% 66% 100% (77)




We also found that jurisdictions tend to build on
the familiar before working out community disaster
response plans shown in Table 7. Table 7 shows that
unless a jurisdiction adopts one of the more widely
accepted planning strategies (e.g., emergency
resource rules or media arrangements), it is less like-
ly to have made arrangements for more usual de-
Table 7
Patterns of Adoption by Jurisdictions
Resource Volunteer Media Public No. of
Rules Plan Cntr. Hotline Localities
Only 1 Adopted 57% 0% 43% 0% 12
Two Adopted 79% 36% 64% 7% 16
Three Adopted 80% 75% 90% 40% 21
All 4 Adopted 100% 100% 100% 100% 15
comprehensive strategies
mands (e.g., volunteer plans and public information
strategies like a hotline). For example, virtually all
(92%) of the cities and counties reporting arrange-
ments for a public hotline also have plans working
closely with the news media to disseminate public
information in a crisis. Unfortunately, jurisdictions
that have not planned for media's involvement in
disaster public information problems have not
planned for the alternative either. These results sug-
gest that management is less likely to develop com-
prehensive strategies for a disaster problem like
public information unless the process has started
with applying the simpler and/or more familiar
experiences of management to the potential prob-
lems faced in a disaster.
Perceived Obstacles to Disaster Planning
Responding to disasters is a unique area of public
service policy because it is the one instance where,
under most state statues, localities are free to plan
for and carry out virtually any physical, fiscal or
organizational task in a disaster. This makes the in-
dividual views and intentions of key public man-
agers an essential part of planning for community
response and, frankly, the major ingredient in deter-
mining what kinds of plans will result.
In an attempt to assess the acceptability of the
planning methods included in our survey, individual
views on several obstacles to adoption were col-
lected. These obstacles included perceived costs,
legal constraints, lack of operational benefits and
low administrative priority for disaster planning.
They were selected for inclusion in the survey based
on a pilot study of managerial views carried out in
1983 (Kartez and Kelley 1985). The following discus-
sion outlines the extent to which the larger sample
of managers viewed these constraints as significant.
Resource Rules: Thirty-six percent of the 250 man-
agers surveyed agreed that they have the informal
ability to "bend administrative rules" in a disaster
without formal arrangements. Most (75%) consider
the ability to make flexible decisions in a disaster,
without the burden of routine administrative con-
straints, as being essential. Only 30% believe there
are legal obstacles to doing this. This is a good
example of where a perceived constraint does not
really exist, as statutes in all of the states surveyed
here provide for local suspension of routine pro-
cedures in a formally declared disaster. This points
out that the planning process does not always
change perceptions of how a disaster situation is dif-
ferent from the traditional legal constraints on
public service administration. Finally, ninety-two
managers (37%) believed that disaster planning will
need greater administrative priority before emer-
gency resource rules will be formally adopted in
their jurisdiction's plans.
Volunteer Plans: A large majority (80%) agreed that
individual citizens can provide a useful resource in
a disaster response. A smaller proportion (30%)
qualified this opinion by saying that only trained
volunteers would be useful. Half (47%) saw the risk
of legal liability as a drawback to making plans for
using volunteers. Again, state statues provide special
authorization for use of volunteers in a declared disas-
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ter, with reduced liability risks for local government.
Given the probability that many key department
heads are not aware of these provisions, the concerns
surrounding legal liability have a negative effect on
planning possibilities. One-third stated that the lack
of staff to supervise volunteers is also an obstacle
to their use. One-third also stated that disaster plan-
ning will need higher priority before effort will be
expended to plan for volunteer organization.
Media Centers: Few managers appear willing to
leave disaster relationships with the media com-
pletely unplanned. A total of 81% disagreed with
the idea some managers have espoused that "A me-
dia center isn't worth planning because they'll find
us anyway." Only 21% felt that staff needs are an
obstacle to planning for and operating a media in-
formation center in a disaster. However, despite the
high acceptability and perceived benefits of this
strategy, 30% believe disaster planning will need
higher local priority before such arrangements will
be made.
Disaster Hotlines: An alternative to complete reli-
ance on the commercial media for disseminating di-
saster public information was regarded as having
some benefits (40%) or great benefits (40%).
Equally, 80% of managers surveyed believe citizens
will call a hotline to get instructions and information
in a prolonged community disaster response and re-
covery. Tempering this enthusiasm, however, was
the response of 57% of all managers who questioned
the survival of phone systems in a major disaster.
This was more of a drawback among earthquake-
wary California managers (68%) than among Wash-
ington (46%) or Utah (36%) managers. Many of
those responding cited a lack of staff (43%) and the
costs of hotline equipment (38%) as principal ob-
stacles to providing for a public hotline. About 40%
believe that disaster planning needs greater priority
before such arrangements will be made.
Positive Factors
Two factors also appear to have positive, rather
than dampening influences on individual opinions
about adopting these disaster response planning
strategies: operational experience and involvement
in the planning process. The managers in this sam-
ple have had much more operational experience
with acquiring emergency resources and providing
emergency public information to the media than ex-
perience with managing citizen volunteers or operat-
ing special information efforts like hotlines. Those
departments with volunteer and hotline experience
rate these two strategies as much more feasible, on
average, than managers without such experience.
Experience with public information efforts in general
also made a strong difference in the opinions of
Washington participants. As a group, they have had
liabilities of volunteers
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less experience in this area (56%) than either Califor-
nia (75%) or Utah (86%) participants.
Departmental involvement in disaster planning
also made a moderately positive difference in re-
sponses regarding the three community-oriented
strategies (volunteers, media and mass public infor-
mation). Managers whose departments have com-
mitted staff to disaster planning responsibilities or
who frequently participate in planning activities
with other agencies view the chances of adopting
planning arrangements as being better.
No single factor was found to completely explain
variations in local planning choices and opinions.
It can be said, though, that jurisdictions which 1)
have departments experienced in community disas-
ter behavior; 2) have departments which are in-
volved in ongoing disaster planning activities and;
3) have managers which value disaster planning as
a priority are those most likely to devote effort to
these needs.
Planning Implications
The results of this survey are not necessarily sur-
prising but they do point out that local government
willingness and ability to plan for unfamiliar demands
of a crisis are affected by a mixture of influences, in-
cluding experience, good intra-organizational commu-
nications, and support from top management. Each
ingredient plays a key role. The most troublesome
aspect of community crisis planning, of which disas-
ter planning is only one component, is the basic dif-
ficulty of planning for unfamiliar, hence somewhat
unreal, problems. Because of this, experience plays
a great role in shaping perceptions of what to plan
for.
The results of this survey show that a good deal
of experience could be shared within the confines
of one city or county's personnel. This is especially
true recalling that many cities and counties are less
familiar with disaster planning requirements than
those in the regions covered here. As time goes by,
individual agencies' assumptions about what is being
planned for and what can and should be included in
plans tend to drift apart. Different experiences and
perspectives on the structure of relevant problems
may lead to different expectations of planned solu-
tions. Because of this problem, the most common
local disaster planning activity involves an annual
simulated crisis decision making exercise. As a re-
cent Federal Emergency Management Agency plan-
ning handbook points out: "Key leaders more often
than not will not know what the local plan provides
for, even if personnel from their own departments
have participated in developing it .. . the ability to
conduct coordinated lifesaving operations can only
be developed by exercises."
Local emergency coordinators often have diffi-
culty securing key management's participation in
these exercises, as well as involving the departments
in an ongoing process. Out of the several hundred
departments participating in this survey, only half
participated in planning activities more than once
in the preceding year. Under these conditions, plans
can become obsolete or changed without notice.
Sharing knowledge and experience more frequently
could have an impact on planning choices and the
quality of coordination. Although exercises are
essential, resistance to them can be stiff because they
are performance-oriented rather than forums for
discussion. As the emergency manager in one ur-
ban county of over one million put it: "Exercises
sometimes embarrass the department heads, and
we're not trying to do that. Our approach has
changed to a learning experience, not putting them
on the spot."
Table 8
Preferences for Planning Information
Little or Some Great
Info. Sources No Benefit Benefit Benefit
Talk w/ Experienced
Managers 4% 35% 61%
Seminars on Cases 11% 52% 38%
All-Day Exercises 16% 51% 33%
Tabletop Exercises 19% 56% 25%
Written Case Studies 29% 60% 12%
We asked this sample of managers to rate the
benefits of several different sources of information
on disaster planning needs, including exercises
(Table 8). A clear preference was expressed for get-
ting this information from contact with professional
colleagues who have managed large scale disaster
responses in other areas. Case studies and emer-
gency exercises were also favored methods.
This finding created a dilemma given the other
results of the survey; there is clearly a good deal
of experience that can and should be shared between
the agencies in the same city or county. For example,
managers that perceive certain legal obstacles need
to know what arrangements already exist that nul-
continued on page 45
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Hazard Reduction Through Development
Management in Hurricane-Prone Localities:
State of the Art
Timothy Beatley and David R. Godschalk
The state of the art in using development management strategies to reduce hurricane hazards is explored
through a 1984 survey of hurricane-prone localities in 19 states. Contrary to some of the hazard mitigation
literature, results show not only a high priority for hazard mitigation but also a high reliance on development
management approaches, as compared with building, strengthening, and environmental alteration.
Until recently, the plans and programs employed
by coastal communities to help mitigate hurricane
and severe storm impacts have been poorly docu-
mented. Our research seeks a better understanding
of local hazard mitigation measures and their effec-
tiveness in reducing storm threats. To gather infor-
mation, we mailed a questionnaire to planners and
public officials in high-hazard coastal localities in
nineteen states.
The questionnaire asked:
1. What types of programs and measures
(including development management) are
currently employed by coastal localities to
reduce hurricane and storm hazards?
2. How effective are these programs and
measures at reducing storm hazards?
3. What are the major characteristics and at-
tributes of coastal development, and what
are the factors which influence these
patterns?
4. What are the major factors which influence
the political feasibility and acceptability of
hazard mitigation measures, and specifi-
cally development management?
5. What are the factors which influence the
effectiveness of mitigation programs and
measures, and specifically development
management?
This article synthesizes information from the
survey findings. 1 Among the highlights of these find-
ings are:
• a surprisingly high priority for hazard miti-
gation;
• a surprisingly high number of adopted storm
hazard reduction strategies;
• a surprisingly high degree of operating develop-
ment management programs;
• a reasonably high effectiveness rating for
overall reduction efforts.
Survey Population
The questionnaire was designed to document
mitigation efforts of coastal areas most susceptible
to hurricane and coastal storm forces. Rather than
select localities according to some subjective assess-
ment of hurricane risk, we decided that an objec-
tive selection could be appropriately based on
"Velocity-Zone" or "V-Zone" designations provided
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) under the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram (NFIP). V-zones are coastal waterfront areas
which are of sufficient fetch to support a minimum
three-foot wave atop the still flood waters (see U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 1975). In these areas,
higher actuarial flood insurance rates apply and
special building provisions are required under NFIP.
All localities of over 1,000 population containing
V-zones were surveyed. The population was determined
from the FEMA "communities file," supplemented by
a FEMA listing of localities currently being studied
for V-zone designation. 2 Questionnaires were mailed
to 636 localities in 18 Gulf and Atlantic coast states
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(Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Virginia). In addition, the four counties
in Hawaii were included.
Each locality containing V-zones received a ques-
tionnaire in June, 1984. As of December 1, 1984,
420 survey responses had been received, for a
response rate of 66 %. 3
Respondent Characteristics
Information from the questionnaire provides
useful insights into a number of important charac-
teristics of hurricane-prone localities. Important
highlights include:
• The predominant type of existing development
within the floodplains of hurricane-prone
survey communities is single-family detached
residential. Assessments of new development
indicate that a high degree of multi-family and
commercial construction (including commer-
cial, recreational and hotel/motel is sited in
coastal floodplains.
• In a significant number of the communities
surveyed (over one-third), hazard-free develop-
ment sites (sites outside of the 100-year
floodplain) were considered to be either scarce
or very scarce.
• More than half of the survey respondents
(57%) did not know how long it would take
to evacuate their communities should a hur-
ricane threaten. About one-half of these
respondents were located in jurisdictions of less
than 20,000 in population.
• The majority of respondents were at least
somewhat familiar with state programs assist-
ing localities in storm hazard management.
Most had received some type of state assistance
in the past five years, with information on the
National Flood Insurance Program and floodplain
maps being the most frequent types of assistance.
One-half of the respondents also indicated that
their communities had received assistance with
disaster preparedness plans.
• In over half of the communities, a regional
agency had been involved in storm hazard miti-
gation. The most frequent type of involvement
was the preparation of a regional evacuation
plan.
Storm Threat Priority
The survey results challenge previously held per-
spectives on the local political salience of hurricane
hazards. Current literature describing the politics of
natural hazards discount their relative importance
to public officials (e.g. Rossi, Wright and Weber-
Burchin 1982; Drabek, Mushkatel and Kilijanek
1983). We expected similar results from our ques-
tionnaire. Overall, however, approximately 72% of
the respondents indicated that their jurisdiction's
governing body considered the threat of severe
coastal storms of at least medium priority in com-
parison with other local issues. Close to half of the
respondents (46%) indicated the priority to be of
either high or very high priority. (Table 1)
Table 1
Elected Governing Body's Priority for Storm Hazard
in Comparison With Other Local Isssues
Frequency Percent
Very High Priority 68 16.3
High Priority 126 30.2
Medium Priority 108 25.9
Low Priority 85 20.4
Very Low Priority 30 7.2
N=417
Thus, in apparent contrast to much of the recent
natural hazards literature, a substantial percentage
of coastal localities consider the storm threat of high
importance as compared with other local issues. A
partial explanation for this is, of course, seen in the
nature of the population. These are coastal areas
where the full force of coastal storms is felt and
where people have the most to lose (i.e. where the
risk to life and property is greatest) should a hur-
ricane or severe storm occur.
Mitigation Programs and Their Effectiveness
The survey asked about storm hazard reduction
strategies and about the use of programs to alter the
coastal environment, to strengthen buildings and
facilities, and to manage development. Respondents
described and ranked these approaches and evalu-
ated their effectiveness.
Explicit Storm Hazard Reduction Strategies
Respondents were asked if their locality had
adopted an explicit storm hazard reduction strategy
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in addition to their participation in the National
Flood Insurance Program. Surprisingly, about half
(51%) of the respondents indicated that an explicit
strategy did exist. Those who indicated they had
such a strategy were asked about specific strategy
objectives. Ten objectives were listed in the question-
naire with respondents permitted to circle as many
objectives as were applicable. The two most fre-
quently selected objectives (by about 60% of the
respondents in each case) were: conserving the pro-
tective features of the natural environment and in-
creasing the ability of private structures and facilities
to withstand storms. The two objectives most
closely related to development management also
received a high percentage of responses: guiding new
development into less hazardous areas and locating
public facilities in less susceptible areas. (Table 2).
The lowest ranked objectives were relocation, either
of private or public structures and facilities.
Programs to Structurally Alter the Coastal
Environment
Programs which structurally modify or alter the
coastal environment include sand trapping struc-
tures (e.g. groins, jetties), sand moving programs
(e.g. beach nourishment, beach scraping), shoreline
protection works (e.g. bulkheads, seawalls,
revetments), and flood control works (e.g. dikes,
channels, retaining ponds) (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 1981). Substantial use of each of these
approaches was found, although shoreline protec-
tion works was a clear leader with more than two-
thirds of the responding localities indicating that
such measures were in use. The use of sand trap-
ping, sand moving and flood control works was
about even, with approximately one-third of the
responding localities using them.
Respondents were also asked to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of these programs in reducing local storm
hazards. Flood control works and shoreline protec-
tion received the highest effectiveness ratings, with
the remaining two categories falling considerably
behind. Sand trapping structures received the lowest
rating even though they were used by almost as
many localities as flood control works.
Programs to Strengthen Buildings and Facilities
To strengthen buildings and structures, and the
private and public facilities that accompany them,
local governments rely on building codes, NFIP re-
quirements, and construction standards. Almost all
L27
74
9. Relocation of existing public facilities and
structures into less-hazardous areas 14
10 Relocation of existing private development
into less hazardous areas 11
N=212
"Respondents were asked to check all relevant categories
responding localities had a building code in place
(90%) and had met the minimum elevation and
floodproofing standards required by FEMA under
the provisions of the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram (94%) (See Conservation Foundation 1980 for
a review of NFIP requirements). About 47% of the
respondents had special storm resistant building
standards in place and well over one-third were
floodproofing public facilities and structures. Only
15% of the responding localities, however, had
adopted elevation and floodproofing standards
which were more stringent than those required
under NFIP (Table 3).
Development Management Measures
"Development management" is defined to include
"programs and policies which control or influence
the location, density, timing and type of develop-
ment which occurs in a jurisdiction" (Godschalk,
Brower et al 1979; Brower et al 1984 for a review
of this concept). Respondents were asked to indicate
from a list which development management tools
and measures were currently used in their jurisdic-
tion, and the extent to which they serve to reduce
local storm hazards.
Specific development management measures were
organized under six headings: 1) planning; 2) develop-
59.9
Table 2
Objectives of Storm Hazard Reduction Strategy*
Rank Order Frequency Percent
1. Increasing ability of private structures and
facilities in hazardous areas to withstand
storm forces
2. Conserving protective features of the natural
environment (e.g. dune protection)
3. Increasing evacuation capacity
4. Increasing ability of public structures and
facilities in hazardous areas to withstand
storm forces
5. Locating new public facilities and structures
in areas less susceptible to storm hazards
6. Guiding new private development into areas
less susceptible to storm hazards
7. Provision of adequate storm shelters
8. Structurally-altering and/or reinforcing the


















the popularity of zoning
and
subdivision regulations
ment regulation; 3) public facilities policy; 4) taxation,
financial and other incentives; 5) public acquisition;
and 6) information dissemination. Overall, 21 dif-
ferent measures were listed in this question, ranging
from zoning and subdivision provisions to below
market property taxes. (Godschalk and Brower,
1985; McElyea, Brower and Godschalk, 1982 for an
application of these techniques to hazard mitigation).
Table 3
Programs to Strengthen Buildings and Facilities
Average Effectiveness






NFIP 394 93.8 3.86
2. Building






















Most local governments are using some form of
development management. More than seventy per-
cent of the respondents have six or more techniques
currently in use (Table 4). About 15% have eleven
or more of these measures in use. The majority of
localities, roughly 55%, fall within the 6 to 10 mea-
sure range.
The most popular measures in use include zoning,
subdivision regulations, and planning. Table 5 lists
the development management techniques in order
of frequency selected by respondents.
Development regulation includes traditional land
use controls, particularly zoning and subdivision
regulations. These two measures are currently in use
in most responding localities, including 87% for

















proximately half of the respondents have shoreline
setback provisions, while over one-third have dune
protection and over a quarter have special hazard
area ordinances.
Under planning instruments, the comprehensive
or land use plan was the most frequently used
(84%). Evacuation plans ranked second in frequency
at 66%, while the capital improvements program
ranked third, with about half the respondents indi-
cating its use. Not surprisingly, plans and policy
documents dealing specifically with the reduction
of storm hazards were considerably fewer in num-
ber. About 19% of the respondents had hurricane/
storm components in their comprehensive plans and
about 21% had recovery/reconstruction plans or
policies.
Public facility policies concerning the construc-
tion and location of facilities, structures and other
public investments can be an important means of
controlling development. Forty-six percent of the re-
spondents noted that their locality had policy in
place to locate public structures and buildings in low
risk areas; 31% indicated that their locality attempts
to discourage development in high hazard areas
through the strategic placement of capital facilities.
Unlike the more general techniques, these capital fa-
cilities approaches are explicitly storm hazard
related.
Three types of measures were included under the
heading of taxation and financial incentives: reduced
or below market taxation, impact taxes or special
assessments, and devices for the transfer of devel-
opment potential. Each of these measures was
specifically related to the mitigation of storm
hazards. Perhaps due to the narrowness of the
definition, relatively few respondents said they are
using these techniques for such purposes. Impact
taxes/special assessments received the smallest
number of responses (2%), followed by reduced or
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below market taxation (11%). Development poten-
tial transfer measures were more popular, being used
by 22% of respondents.
An effective approach to storm hazard mitigation
is public acquisition of undeveloped land in high
hazard areas, preempting its availability for private
development. One option is to purchase the fee-
simple title for the land (all the rights to the land),
while another option is to purchase only the "devel-
opment rights" to this land (an easement restricting
development). The former is a more traditional ap-
proach and 29% of the respondents indicated that
such an approach was in use, compared with 14%
using the second approach — the purchase of devel-
opment rights or easements in high hazard areas.
Very few were using programs to purchase damaged
buildings and structures in hazard areas (3%) or
programs to relocate structures outside of hazard
areas (2%).
































Location of public structures and
buildings to reduce storm risks
Dune protection regulations
Location of capital facilities to reduce or
discourage development in high
hazard areas
Acquisition of undeveloped land in
hazardous areas
Special hazard area ordinance
Hazard disclosure requirements
in real estate transactions
Transfer of development potential from
hazardous to non-hazardous sites




Acquisition of development rights
or scenic easements
Reduced or below market taxation
Acquisition of damaged buildings in
hazardous areas
Building relocation program
Impact taxes or special assessments
N=420


















































Development Management Measures in Order of Perceived Effectiveness
Average Effectiveness Rating
Type of Measure
Special hazard area ordinance
Impact taxes or special assessments
Dune protection regulations
Location of public structures to minimize risk
Acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas
Shoreline setback regulations
Evacuation plan
Acquisition of damaged buildings in hazardous areas
Transfer of development potential from hazardous
to non-hazardous sites
Location of capital facilities to reduce or discourage
development in high hazard areas
Hurricane/storm component of comprehensive plan
Building relocation program
Construction practice seminars for buildings
Zoning ordinance
Subdivsion ordinance
Reduced or below market taxation
Recovery/reconstruction plan or policies
Comprehensive/land use plan
Hazard disclosure requirements
in real estate transactions
Acquisition of development rights or scenic easements
Capital improvements program
N=420























uals will make responsible decisions if they have ac-
cess to all the relevant information. This has spurred
interest in programs to inform the housing consu-
mer, the developer/builder and the general public
about the risks associated with hurricanes and severe
coastal storms (e.g. see Palm 1981). Two types of
information dissemination programs were investi-
gated: hazard disclosure in real estate transactions
and construction practice seminars. About one-
quarter of the respondents had hazard disclosure
provisions in place, while approximately 15% used
construction practice seminars.
Table 6 presents rankings of the specific develop-
ment management measures by their perceived ef-
fectiveness at reducing local storm hazards. No plan-
ning approaches appear in the top ten in terms of
effectiveness at reducing storm hazards. Three regu-
latory approaches are highly rated: special hazard
area ordinances, dune protection regulations, and
shoreline setback regulations. Both public facilities
policies are perceived to be highly effective, as are
programs designed to acquire undeveloped land and
damaged buildings in hazardous areas. Impact taxes
and programs which transfer development potential
from hazardous to non-hazardous sites are also per-
ceived as highly effective. In contrast, among those
programs and policies perceived as least effective at
reducing storm hazards are the following (the lowest
five): capital improvements programs, acquisition
of development rights or scenic easements, hazard
disclosure requirements, comprehensive/land use
plans, and recovery/reconstruction plans or policies.
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Ranking Mitigation Approaches
Respondents were asked to rank the importance
of the three mitigation approaches in reducing storm
hazards in their jurisdiction. Of the three ap-
proaches, development management received the
most top rankings. Strengthening buildings and fa-
cilities received the most second rankings, while
structural reinforcement of the coastal environment
received the most third rankings (Table 7).
It should be remembered that this ranking is
relative to the specific responding locality. That is,
even in circumstances where development manage-
ment is ranked third (last) by a respondent, the locality
still may have a solid and innovative development
management program. Its lower ranking may be at-
tributable, for instance, to the importance of struc-
tural improvements (e.g., in the case where a large
amount of the hazard area has already been
developed.)
Overall Effectiveness
After considering all of the strategies and tech-
niques employed in their jurisdictions, respondents
rated the combined effectiveness of these at reducing
local storm hazards. Most felt that local programs
were at least partially effective. Over 70% believed
their combined programs were either moderately ef-
fective or very effective, while only a small 6% be-
lieved these programs were not effective at all. The
majority of respondents (58%) placed their jurisdic-
tions in the "moderately effective" category. Thus,
in most responding areas, room for increased effec-
tiveness exists (Table 8).
Feasibility of Enactment and Enforcement
A primary objective of the survey was to obtain
insights into factors which influence the political
feasibility of development management. Of eleven
possible obstacles to the enactment of development
management measures, the following five were most
frequently identified, with each chosen by nearly
seventy percent of the respondents: 1) the general
conservative attitude toward government control of
private property rights; 2) a general feeling that the
community can "weather the storm"; 3) lack of ade-
quate financial resources; 4) the existence of more
pressing local problems and concerns; and 5) the op-
position of real estate and development interests. In
addition, the absence of politically-active individuals
and groups advocating hurricane/storm mitigation,
while not as frequently selected, was ranked as an
important obstacle.
Respondents were also asked to review several
popular arguments against development manage-
ment and to indicate the extent to which these have
Table 7
Ranking of the Mitigation Strategies Based on Overall





1. Structural reinforcement of
coastal environment
N=397 87(21.9%) 118(29.7%) 192(48.4%)
2. Strengthening buildings and
facilities
N=398 103 (25.9%) 185 (46.5%) 110 (27.6%)
3. Development management
N=403 215 (53.4%) 90 (22.3%) 98 (24.3%)
been important in their localities. One important
argument against the enactment of development
management identified by respondents is that such
measures lead to increased development costs. Other
arguments which were deemed important suggested:
1) decisions about risks from coastal storms are best
left to the individual; 2) development management
measures will dampen the local economy; and 3)
particular development management measures are
illegal or unconstitutional.
The survey also sought to determine whether
problems exist in implementing and enforcing those
development management measures in place. About
half the respondents (49%) indicated that they had
encountered implementation or enforcement prob-
lems. Of these respondents, the most frequently
identified type of problem was that of insufficient
funds. Public opposition, lack of support by public
officials, lack of qualified personnel, and an insuf-
ficient data base were also indicated as problems by
a significant portion of the respondents. Moreover,
approximately one-third of the respondents (33%)
indicated that their localities had experienced nega-
tive consequences as a result of development man-
agement programs. The most frequent selection by







From the information contained in the question-






raising the awareness of
local officials
Table 8
Overall Effectiveness of Storm Mitigation
Frequency Percent
1. Very effective 50 12.6
2. Moderately effective 231 58.0
3. Slightly effective 93 23.4
4. Not effective 24 6.0
N=398
to provide clues about interactions between coastal
development patterns, political feasibility of mitiga-
tion measures and perceived effectiveness of these
programs at reducing storm hazards. While this
analysis is preliminary, several interesting relation-
ships emerged:
• The extent of the coastal floodplain developed
appears to be positively influenced by the ex-
tent of the locality's area lying in the floodplain
and the scarcity of hazard-free development
sites. Also, where an agricultural economy still
exists, development in the floodplain is likely
to be less substantial.
• Adoption of an explicit storm hazard mitiga-
tion strategy is positively related to the prior-
ity given to the storm hazard by the local gov-
erning body, the percentage of a locality's land
in the coastal floodplain, and the proportion of
local development occurring in these hazard
areas.
• About 60% of the respondents indicated that
their localities had experienced a hurricane or
severe storm since 1970. This past storm experi-
ence appears to be positively associated with the
adoption of explicit storm hazard reduction
strategies and development management
measures.
• The quantity of new development, as measured
by building permit data, is positively associated
with the adoption of explicit hazard reduction
strategies and development management
measures.
• Population size and number of planning per-
sonnel are positively associated with the adop-
tion of explicit hazard reduction strategies and
development management measures.
• An active role of regional agencies in storm
hazard mitigation is positively associated with
the adoption of explicit hazard reduction strate-
gies and development measures.
• The overall effectiveness of storm hazard miti-
gation programs, including development man-
agement, is positively associated with priority
given to the storm threat, and negatively associ-
ated with a lack of support by public officials.
As well, areas that have explicit storm hazard
reduction strategies are more likely to have ef-
fective storm hazard management programs.
• Knowledge of sources of state assistance is
positively associated with the effectiveness of
development management measures.
Implications for planning
The preliminary survey findings suggest a number
of implications for coastal planners and policy-
makers concerned with enacting and implementing
development management measures to reduce storm
hazards. Many factors and community characteris-
tics affect the feasibility of hazard mitigation. Some
are beyond the control of planners, while others are
more accessible to influence. Even though planners
can do little to change the fixed factors, they must
be aware of these constraints when designing their
programs.
Obviously, mitigation measures will be more feas-
ible in localities where higher priority is given to
storm hazards. Planners can heighten awareness of
the severity and potential destructiveness of storm
forces, both on the part of the general public and
local elected officials. They can connect concern over
hurricanes with planning and development solu-
tions. Since mitigation efforts tend to be more feas-
ible in localities which have had recent experiences
with hurricanes and severe coastal storms, planners
can highlight the storm histories of their
jurisdictions.
Mitigation programs are more feasible in localities
of larger population size, and with greater planning
resources and personnel. While these factors may
be largely beyond the control of local planners,
higher levels of government may be able to influ-
ence them. State grants which support the prepara-
tion of land use plans and/or which allow funds for
technical assistance have enhanced many states' local
planning capacity. Regional agencies can also be
used to supplement local personnel, resources and
planning expertise. In many states, regional agencies
have been instrumental in raising the awareness of
local officials and the coastal public concerning
storm hazards.
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A locality's physical characteristics and develop-
ment patterns present both mitigation opportunities
and mitigation constraints. Keeping development
away from hazard areas will tend to be more feasible
in localities where viable non-intensive uses for these
areas, such as agricultural activities, still exist. As
well, development pressures in hazard areas will
tend to be greater where alternative sites for devel-
opment are less available. In many circumstances
it simply may not be possible to prevent develop-
ment in hazardous areas without entirely stopping
development in the locality.
Storm hazard priority is also affected by physical
characteristics and patterns of development. Where
the hazard area comprises a larger portion of the
locality, and where a high degree of development
is already occurring in the hazard zone, storm haz-
ard priority is enhanced. In these situations, the po-
tential destructiveness of storms is harder to ignore.
The finding, which shows that the use of develop-
ment management is greater where development
pressures are more extensive, supports this. It sug-
gests moreover, a kind of "tipping-point" theory
about the use of development management. The
need for management programs may not exist until
a critical level of development occurs. The trick for
planners and policymakers concerned about mitiga-
tion, then, is to employ development management
tools before the extent and pace of hazard zone
development forecloses any possible future reduc-
tion in coastal damages and loss of life.
The survey results also indicate the importance
of political constraints to mitigation, including the
opposition of real estate and development interests,
and the absence of politically-supportive groups.
Planners must begin to work with real estate, busi-
ness and other politically important groups in the
locality to inform them of the benefits of mitigation.
Planners may also need to nurture and develop other
local constituencies that will be politically supportive
of mitigation efforts. Recreation and conservation
groups, for example, may represent potent political
allies in the support of mitigation programs. The
importance of combining storm hazard reduction
with other salient local goals cannot be overstated.
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a lack of preparation
learning from experience
Over 600 communities on the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts are vulnerable to the devastating impacts of
severe hurricanes. While there are many communi-
ties at risk, relatively few have experienced the ma-
jor recovery and reconstruction process that follows
a major storm. Many communities are unprepared
for the pressing issues that will face a community
after a disaster. This lack of pre-storm planning can
affect a community's ability to recover quickly and
smoothly should a coastal disaster occur. With more
readily predicted community disasters, such as river-
ine flooding, decision-makers can build on their
community's past experience to plan for and mitigate
the impacts of future occurrences. Hurricanes, on
the other hand, have a low probability of striking
particular communities in any given year. As a re-
sult, they do not provide a good base from which
local officials and policymakers can "learn from ex-
perience." The severity of a hurricane's economic and
psychological impact, furthermore, demands an ex-
amination of the post-disaster and reconstruction ef-
forts of hurricane stricken communities from which
disaster planning techniques can be developed.
Severe hurricanes destroy existing development
so effectively that they have been called "the purest
form of urban renewal." Communities often use hur-
ricane demolition as a means of altering their pre-
storm development patterns. Development is moved
away from hazardous areas to reduce private property
loss and to minimize the amount of public infrastruc-
ture at risk. A community may have the opportunity
to acquire prime waterfront property and thereby
expand its public beach areas, alter undesirable de-
velopment trends and reconstruct severely damaged
areas in more attractive and less vulnerable ways
than existed previously. While a disaster may present
opportunities for changing development patterns,
it also creates a number of pressures on the commu-
nity which may work against the enactment of de-
velopment management policy changes. In an effort
to better understand these pressures and obstacles
in the post-storm reconstruction process, three com-
munities heavily impacted by recent hurricanes were
studied as cases of development management. The
three communities included: Harrison County, Missis-
sippi (Hurricane Camille, 1969); Gulf Shores, Ala-
bama (Hurricane Fredrick, 1979); and the Galveston
Bay area (Hurricane Alicia, 1983). This article will
briefly discuss the redevelopment and reconstruction
trends observed in these communities.
Harrison County, Mississippi
Hurricane Camille, which battered the Gulf coast
in August 1969, is one of two "category 5" storms
on the Saffir-Simpson scale ever recorded to strike
the United States (category 5 is the most severe). The
This article is based on information collected under
NSF Grant No. CEE-8217U5, Hurricane Hazard Re-
duction through Development Management. Opin-
ions are solely those of the authors.
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Bob and Janet Helm, right, face off against Carol and Nancy Cash in a game of cards at the evacuation center set up at West Brunswick High School
storm had a seven mile wide storm center, winds of
over 200 miles per hour, and a storm surge that
ranged from 17-23 feet in the coastal communities
of Harrison County, Mississippi. While older stately
homes in the sheltered higher areas on the coast sur-
vived the storm, almost all construction in the lower
lying lands was destroyed. This included a "hurricane
proof" house which was totally destroyed, killing the
owner and the friends who had sought shelter with
him.
Four of the communities most severly hit by Hur-
ricane Camille were in Harrison County. Gulfport
and Biloxi are sizable towns of almost 50,000 residents;
Long Beach and Pass Christian are considerably
smaller with only 6,000 and 3,000 residents, respec-
tively. These communities have been plagued by
storm damages since their founding. After a hurri-
cane caused extensive damage to the beach highway
in 1915, a seawall was constructed along the entire
length of Harrison County's 26 mile shoreline. Sub-
sequent coastal storms and hurricanes caused the
shoreline to erode dramatically. In 1951, construc-
tion began on an artificial sand beach to act as a
protective barrier for the seawall highway and low-
lying development. Today, a costly annual beach
nourishment program sustains the beach.
The National Flood Insurance Program was insti-
tuted one year before Hurricane Camille hit the Gulf
Coast. Unfortunately, at that time, there were no
communities yet participating in the program. After
the storm, the Governor of Mississippi established
a 12-member commission — the Governor's Emer-
gency Council (GEO — to act as a temporary overseer
of long range regional development of the impacted
coastline. This role was later expanded to include the
coordination of Federal Disaster Relief efforts when
President Nixon designated the GEC as the single
contact for federal aid. Despite the equal representa-
tion of coastal residents and federal administrators
on the GEC, its policies were subject to frequent at-
tack and condemnation by residents of these ex-
tremely conservative coastal communities.
The lack of adequate flood insurance was a pri-







Seawall at Galveston Bay
Harrison County. Many property owners did not
ever rebuild. According to interviews conducted with
local realtors during the summer of 1984, land prices
fell dramatically after the storm. For many years
prices remained depressed. In the period immedi-
ately following the storm, development was concen-
trated in the rural, upland area of the county. To
this day, developers and local realtors admit that
they are conscious of the dangers of building in the
most low-lying lands. There has been a general re-
luctance to redevelop along the shoreline.
Biloxi and Gulfport had both adopted a building
code a number of years before Camille. As part of
the requirement for acceptance into the National
Flood Insurance Program, these Building Codes were
strengthened and extended county-wide. General
confusion resulted from a waiver of the building per-
mit procedures immediately following the storm,
several rounds of revisions to the new code, and lack
of compliance on the part of lending institutions
such as Farmers Home Administration. The end result
was that a large (but unknown) number of buildings
severely damaged by the storm throughout Harrison
County were reconstructed without conforming to the
more restrictive building code standards.
With the influx of federal disaster relief, the larger
towns used the storm as an opportunity for down-
town revitalization. The most severely damaged
areas were rezoned for more intense uses. Forty-six
properties in the Biloxi downtown waterfront area
which were completely destroyed by the storm were
acquired by the town. The land was used for a sub-
stantial urban renewal development. Hazard mitiga-
tion was not, however, the community goal behind
this post-storm property acquisition.
The smaller communities of Long Beach and Pass
Christian did not recover as well as their larger coun-
terparts. Biloxi and Gulfport were better equipped
to handle the disaster and were more successful in
applying for grants to aid in their redevelopment.
Today, hurricane hazard mitigation is a primary
concern of planners in the Harrison County area.
Despite this concern, local decision-makers remain
unsatisfied with public evacuation plans and public
education programs. Long range comprehensive
planning has few supporters in these communities.
Most of the cities' current development regulations,
for example, were federally mandated for inclusion
in the National Flood Insurance Program. There is
little local initiative to bolster hazard mitigation pol-
icies (Leyden 1985).
Gulf Shores, Alabama
Hurricane Fredrick, a category 4 storm on the Saf-
fir-Simpson scale, struck the Alabama coastline in
September 1979. It sustained winds of 130 miles per
hour and caused an estimated $1.7 billion in
property damage. In Gulf Shores, about 30 miles
from the storm's landfall, the first two tiers of water-
front development were almost entirely destroyed
or so severely damaged that they could not be re-
paired. The main beach highway was breached in
a number of sections. The water and sewer lines run-
ning alongside the highway were extensively
damaged.
Compared to many coastal areas, Gulf Shores and
the surrounding Baldwin County area were rela-
tively undeveloped in 1979. The town had only
2,000 permanent residents, although this swelled
manyfold in the summer months. The Gulf Shores
area had been growing through the 1960s and 1970s
as a vacation resort area. At the time of the storm,
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it had a few small motels and two condominium de-
velopments. Single family vacation homes and rental
cottages were the most common type of construction.
The town joined the regular phase of the National
Flood Insurance Program in 1971. In that year a
building code was adopted to comply with the mini-
mum program requirements. Buildings built before
1971, however, were not built to any minimum ele-
vation or structural requirements. State or local reg-
ulation of shoreline development was non-existent
and many buildings were sited too close to the shore
to be adequately protected even from long-term ero-
sion. The lack of a professional planning staff and
an unwieldy zoning ordinance compounded the
town's disaster preparedness problems.
After the storm, sixteen counties in the Mobile
Bay and Florida Panhandle area were declared a Fed-
eral Disaster Area. FEMA set up local disaster assis-
tance centers to coordinate disaster relief activities.
In Gulf Shores, federal funds were used for debris
cleanup and removal, and for the restoration and
repair of damaged public facilities. Eligible public
expenses included public water and sewer services,
roads, recreation and park facilities, and other dam-
aged public property such as public buildings.
The community's ability to recover quickly from
the storm's severe impact was clearly related to the
generous level of financial and technical assistance
provided by FEMA. There were frustrations ex-
pressed, however, over the lack of effective commu-
nication between federal and local officials. Local
officials lacked the knowledge and experience to deal
with strict, often unwieldy federal regulations and
federal bureaucratic channels.
The first action the city took after the storm was
to place a building moratorium on reconstruction
in the beach areas. The moratorium lasted until pub-
lic facilities were restored to the area. Minor repairs
were allowed without a permit, but new construc-
tion and repairs to heavily damaged structures
needed building permits. Large numbers of resi-
dences built prior to the minimum elevation and
building code requirements were heavily damaged.
As nonconforming structures, they were required
to be rebuilt to FEMA standards if the damage re-
quired improvements of fifty percent or more than
their pre-storm value. As might be expected, inspec-
tors were under considerable pressure to underesti-
mate the damages to these structures, particularly
if their owners did not have insurance to cover the
losses.
FEMA used 1362 funds to acquire five beach front
parcels adjacent to the town's public beach and trans-
ferred them to the city. In addition, FEMA funded
the preparation of a supplemental building code
which detailed appropriate construction techniques
for high hazard coastal areas. FEMA also provided
funds for a land use plan. The consultant hired to
prepare the plan, however, worked instead on the
more immediate problem of revising the outdated
zoning ordinance. Over two years of reconstruction
and development took place before these became ef-
fective. Finally, in 1981, the Building Code supple-
ment was passed and, in 1982, the zoning ordinance
was approved with revisions.
The town's economy and municipal budget recov-
ered quickly from the storm. "Freddy," as the residents
refer to the storm, is partly credited with initiating a
lucrative development boom which began while re-
construction was still underway. Local realtors sug-
gest that development pressure had been growing
in the Gulf Shores area and that the storm created
an excellent opportunity for developers to acquire
beach front property with the older structures con-
veniently removed. Numerous property owners,
many who were receiving flood insurance payments
for their destroyed buildings, apparently could not
resist offers for their vacant land at ten to twenty
times its original value. In the two years following
the storm, the town issued 77 permits for multi-
family developments. Many of the units were lo-
cated in the Gulf front area.
The pace of development sparked public protest
over the lack of aesthetic and environmental con-
trols assigned to beachfront building. Minimum
sideyard setback regulations, for example, were suc-
cessfully added to the zoning ordinance when it be-
came increasingly apparent that continued lot-line
to lot-line building was blocking the view of the
Gulf. Despite their disdain for private property regu-
lations, Gulf Shores decision-makers became in-
creasingly receptive to development management
measures as the pace and density of development
reached overbearing levels. Recent problems with
poor water quality and an inability to provide water
service at a rate equal to demand has added to local
interest in development management.
Galveston Bay, Texas
Galveston, Texas is located on a barrier island
twenty-eight miles long and one-half to three miles
wide. It is immediately south of Galveston Bay and















the Houston Metropolitan area. The city has a long
history of storm disasters. In 1900, a very severe
storm killed more than 6,000 people. Following this
storm, the town was rebuilt, elevated with fill, and
a massive seawall was constructed in front of the
city for protection against future storms. After suc-
cessive storms, and as the city expanded, the seawall
was strengthened and extended to its current 9.7
mile length and fifteen foot height. In this century,
hurricanes have struck the Texas coast an average
of every two and a half years. Galveston Island, in
particular, has been hit by eight severe storms pre-
ceeding Alicia (1900, 1915, 1919, 1933, 1942, 1961,
1967, and 1970).
Given the city's maligned history, it is not surpris-
ing that the area has a high degree of hurricane haz-
ard awareness. Unfortunately, government response
to these storm hazards has been oriented to im-
proved barriers and improved evacuation plans
rather than loss prevention efforts. The state is
known for its large structural protection works and
its comprehensive hurricane evacuation and educa-
tion program. The use of planning techniques to re-
duce the amount of property at risk from storm
damage, however, has not been seriously
considered.
Hurricane Alicia struck the Texas coast on August
17, 1983. The eye of the storm passed just south of
Galveston Island. It was a medium size storm with
winds up to 115 miles per hour, and a storm surge
of 6 to 10 feet. The land protected by the seawall
was the only area on the island that escaped flood-
ing. The structures behind it suffered only moderate
wind and rain damage. Low lying areas did not en-
joy such protection, however. In the north end of
the bay, a twelve foot storm surge from Galveston
Bay destroyed 300 homes in the Brownwood subdi-
vision of Baytown. Throughout the island, over
1000 single family homes were destroyed and an ad-
ditional 6,700 received major damage (McCloy and
Huffman 1985).
In the aftermath of the storm, a 1362 acquisition
project was suggested by the FEMA Interagency
Hazard Mitigation Team for the Galveston Bay area
(FEMA 1983a). The teams were established to pro-
mote a comprehensive, intergovernmental approach
to flood hazard mitigation during the post-flood re-
covery process. Under the guidelines of the program,
the FEMA regional director appoints a team of
FEMA experts, key federal agency representatives,
and state and local representatives to study mitiga-
tion strategies for local areas. Specifically, the team's
recommendations are to emphasize non-structural
mitigation measures, and to better ensure that the
various federal agencies involved in post-disaster aid
emphasize mitigation of future flood damages. In
a recent article on Disaster Recovery and Hazard Mi-
tigation, Rubin (1985) indicated that the teams have
had a significant effect on the identification and im-
plementation of mitigation measures at the city and
county levels after a major flood-related disaster.
The Team issues two reports: (1) the Interagency
Flood Hazard Mitigation Report, which is released
fifteen days after the disaster with its suggestions for
post-flood mitigation measures, and (2) the Inter-
agency Post-Flood Recovery Progress Report, released
90 days after the disaster which details progress on
each of the original mitigation proposals (see FEMA
1983a, 1983b). The Hazard Mitigation Team follow-
ing Alicia suggested a number of non-structural mi-
tigation techniques, including a land acquisition
project for the Brownwood area.
For Galveston Island, the report suggested that
the city prepare a comprehensive land use plan to
guide development on the largely vacant west end
of the island. It was argued that this plan should
take account of the environmental needs of the bar-
rier island system by using carrying capacity prin-
ciples. Those long range planning recommendations
were the suggestions of hazard mitigation planning
experts who observed the recovery process and vol-
unteered as participants on the Hazard Mitigation
Team. The remaining recommendations for the Gal-
veston area centered on improvements to the build-
ing code, increasing local evacuation awareness, and
holding seminars for local builders on hurricane re-
sistent construction. The Hazard Mitigation Team's
recommendations were advisory, and had no financ-
ing or enforcement power. According to section 406
of the Disaster Relief Act which authorized the
teams, long term implementation of the team's sug-
gestions are the responsibility of the affected states.
Another change in federal policy since 1980 in-
volves the size of the reimbursement allowance from
Federal Disaster Relief. Today, the FDR will reimburse
local communities for only seventy-five percent of their
eligible expenses; local or state government are re-
sponsible for the remainder. This policy was espe-
cially burdensome for the City of Galveston because
of a locally mandated cap on budget increases and
the large proportion of tax-exempt property within
the city.
After the storm, Galveston adopted a three week
development moratorium on reconstruction in the
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west end of the island. The prohibition did not ap-
ply to structures that only needed minor repairs or
for structures landward of the main beach highway.
The moratorium was extended for two more weeks
for property that was between the beach highway
and the Gulf which included most of the V zones
where the damage was heaviest. The storm had
eroded the beach front property and shifted the vege-
tation line as much as 200 feet landward. The ex-
tended moratorium was requested by the State because
the Texas Open Beaches Act stipulates that the pub-
lic beach extends from the water's edge to the vegeta-
tion line. After this large landward shift, hundreds
of homes were situated on property which the State
Attorney General claimed was public, and rebuilding
was prohibited if structures were more than 50 per-
cent damaged.
In addition to the building moratorium, the city
created a Recovery Task Force. The Task Force was
comprised of a number of subcommittees covering
a range of concerns from insurance problems to
building code modifications. The subcommittees
were mainly staffed by community leaders and citi-
zens who volunteered their expertise to help the re-
covery process. The work of the Task Force seems
to have served a number of important functions: 1)
it diverted pressure away from the overworked city
council; 2) it provided an excellent mechanism for
channelling local expertise (such as architects, build-
ers, mental health experts) into the policy-making
arena; and 3) it provided the community with a
much needed sense that their issues and concerns
were being addressed and that the city government
was responsive and organized despite the post-disas-
ter confusion. The most effective subcommittees
were those that addressed immediate recovery con-
cerns such as insurance problems, or short term
housing needs. The longer-range subcommittees
(such as one for redevelopment of the west end of
the island) were less effective in producing substan-
tive recommendations; members indicated that inter-
est flagged in the months following the storm as the
most pressing community issues were resolved.
Sixteen months after Hurricane Alicia, the storm
was credited with initiating economic revitalization
of the seawall-tourist area. Many of the hotels along
the strip were badly in need of remodeling, and the
convention business had been decreasing in recent
years. Although protected from the storm surge by
the seawall, most of the motels and hotels received
extensive wind and rain damage. Insurance pay-
ments provided remodeling and refurbishing capital.
Galveston, in a continued attempt to bolster its
property tax base, is now encouraging higher den-
sity developments on the west end of the island
through tax-increment financing. The financing
scheme uses the increased property taxes which re-
sult from the new development to finance the devel-
opment's infrastructure costs. There are nine zones
in Galveston: seven in areas unprotected by the city's
seawall; two on the east end of the island, in an ac-
creting beach area in front of the protective seawall;
and five on the low-lying west end of the island (He-
genbarth 1985b).
the value of task force
decision-making
Chip Taylor of Carolina Beach has his daughter, Kelli, all wrapped










Each of the community experiences discussed
above is a unique situation. The cities are of vary-
ing sizes, in different states, with different economic
trends and community values. The recovery and re-
construction experiences were heavily influenced by
the current forms of federal disaster assistance. In
this manner, the communities represent a chrono-
logical sketch of changing federal disaster relief pol-
icy: before the NFIP and FEMA; with the NFIP and
early FEMA; and with the NFIP, FEMA, and the
new Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team. Never-
theless, there are a number of reconstruction trends
and similarities within these communities.
One of the most obvious is the desire of the com-
munity to recover and reconstruct as quickly as pos-
sible in an attempt to return to normalcy. Haas et
al (1977), in the landmark piece Reconstruction Fol-
lowing Disaster, states that during the reconstruction
period, "[t]he central issues and decisions are value
choices that give varying emphasis to the early re-
turn to normalcy, the reduction of future vulnerabil-
ity, or to opportunities for improved efficiency,
equity, and amenity." After a storm, some repairs
will begin immediately, such as those to public water
and sewer, electricity, and the road system. Unless
plans have been made preceding the storm to relo-
cate or redesign these facilities, the sense of urgency
to replace these may preclude hazard mitigation op-
portunities, as evidenced in Gulf Shores. This sense
of urgency also affects residential reconstruction.
Homeowners living in temporary housing want to
repair their homes and move back in as soon as pos-
sible. Haas mentions that the strongest pressure of
all for a prompt return to normalcy comes from the
existence of impacted and displaced families and
businesses, and adds that these pressures do not cre-
ate a positive environment for orderly, well-planned
reconstruction processes.
These pressures were particularly felt by those
members of the community who were in positions
to either speed or delay the reconstruction period.
Building Inspectors in both Galveston and Gulf
Shores felt strong pressures to be lenient in issuing
building permits to allow rebuilding. This was most
intense when the building was non-conforming to
current codes, and heavily damaged. In Gulf Shores,
structures damaged more than 50 percent by law
had to conform to the new building code and NFIP
elevation requirements, which could have added
substantially to the reconstruction costs of a non-
conforming building. Particularly when the home-
owner did not have insurance to cover the losses,
much less the cost of rebuilding to higher standards,
officials felt severe pressure to be lenient with neigh-
bors who had "suffered enough already." In Texas,
the Open Beaches Act prohibiting reconstruction
was only applied to structures more than 50 percent
damaged, but sympathetic local inspectors generally
issued rebuilding permits to structures which had
any exterior walls remaining. Policies set in place
before a disaster regarding these decisions and specify-
ing explicit criteria would help ease the discretionary
pressure felt by local officials. In addition, bringing
in temporary inspection officials would help reduce
the massive workload increase, and non-members
of the community would be able to make politically
difficult decisions more objectively.
In addition to the psychological stresses created
during the initial recovery and reconstruction period
which may work against new hazard reducing de-
velopment policies, the storm may also produce
some long-term community perceptions that could
work as obstacles to the enactment of new hazard
mitigation policies. A post-storm perception ex-
pressed in all three communities was that damages
were a function of substandard construction. In-
deed, all the communities had large numbers of se-
verely damaged homes which were constructed prior
to building code and elevation requirements. Build-
ing codes, elevation requirements, and hurricane re-
sistent construction will, of course, help reduce the
level of damages but as the hurricane-proof house
in Harrison County dramatically illustrated, they
should not be regarded as a panacea for safe shore-
line development.
In Galveston and Gulf Shores, it is possible that
the newer requirements for building codes and mini-
mum elevations are perceived as having had a signif-
icant effect on reducing storm damages. Attitudes
expressed in interviews, however, indicate that these
may have had the detrimental effect of lulling the
communities into a false sense of security regarding
their ability to survive another major storm without
sustaining heavy damages. Policy makers concerned
with hazard mitigation may have to overcome this
community perception before other development
management techniques become politically viable.
Well-publicized evacuation plans and procedures
can also add to a false sense of community security.
People may be less likely to actively support hurri-
cane-hazard mitigation policies if they perceive that
they are no longer in any danger. In an area with
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limited access, this will become increasingly impor-
tant as the population size at risk increases beyond
the evacuation capacity of the road system. In Gal-
veston, the evacuation demand is already greater
than the current evacuation capacity, and evacuating
residents could be placed in severe danger during
a full scale evacuation of the island. Residents, how-
ever, seem to express an attitude that if there is a
storm threat, "they will just get up and leave the is-
land," not taking into account that the rest of the
local population has similar plans.
Another community perception evident in both
Galveston and Gulf Shores was that the hurricane
had assisted in producing an economic revitalization
and development boom. After a storm, the large in-
flux of non-local funds from federal and insurance
sources seems to create a heady, almost "boomtown"
atmosphere. With the stress and tension of the im-
mediate recovery period behind them, the post-
storm impressions of community inhabitants seemed
to concentrate on positive economic impacts that the
storm initiated. Even in Harrison County, which did
not experience a significant development boom fol-
lowing Camille, there was a "renewed spirit in the
communities to build back bigger and stronger than
before" (Leyden 1985). The mayor of Gulf Shores
commented that, for his community, there was "a
definite silver lining to the storm."
While the hurricanes did not produce the eco-
nomic boom that occurred afterwards, the storms
appear to have stimulated the processes and short-
ened the time span over which development might
have otherwise taken place. The coastal disaster cre-
ated excellent opportunities for developers to acquire
cheap land, and to approach numerous land owners
who might be more receptive to selling their land
after their homes were severely damaged and after
they had received insurance payments. Policymakers
will have to consider these economic development
forces for two reasons. First, the stronger the devel-
opment forces in the private marketplace, the more
likely that these forces may work against innovative
mitigation efforts, particularly non-structural flood-
hazard mitigation efforts (see Rubin 1985). Second,
and more subtly, it appears that the economic boom
and financial benefits which residents enjoy as a per-
ceived result of the storm, may tend to overshadow
and downplay the damaging and painful effects that
the severe storms produced in the community. This
may lessen the community-based support and inter-
est for hazard mitigation and pre-storm disaster
planning.
While each coastal community will respond and
react to different forces following a severe storm,
planners and policymakers in hurricane prone com-
munities need to acknowledge underlying percep-
tions and trends which may act as obstacles to
enacting hazard mitigation policies. The communi-
ties discussed here were all Gulf coast communities:
traditionally very conservative regarding regulation
of private property, and not historically innovative
in planning techniques. In areas similar to these, the
greatest success for the adoption of hazard mitiga-
tion regulations appears to occur when the proposed
regulations will further other community objectives
which are capable of arousing sufficient community
support to overcome the obstacles to their enact-
ment. Examples of community goals which might
receive a broader based support are aesthetics, or
open space and beach acquisition.
Where development interests are strong and the
localities conservative, the few coastal development
continued on page 43
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Effective dispute resolution is an important attribute of stable community relations. In many western socie-
ties, however, traditional court systems have proven incapable of handling the increasing numbers of cases
before them. The costs of formal adjudication have also been prohibitive for many groups and individuals.
In an attempt to advance a more equitable and more responsive means of resolving community and interper-
sonal conflicts, mediation and arbitration strategies have been developed in many communities.
Gelblum's article describes the role of dispute centers as an institutional source of conflict resolution. These
organizations provide a framework for cooperative, negotiated dispute settlement. The Chapel Hill Dispute





Disputes seem inevitable, both at the intergroup
and interpersonal levels. Conflict has been with us
since "time immemorial" and shows no signs of
abating as a human activity. Anthropologists Laura
Nader and H.F. Todd, Jr. (pp. x-xi) list the follow-
ing as the components of a dispute: that which is
disputed, the parties to the dispute, presentation of
the dispute, procedure or manner of handling, termi-
nation of the grievance and enforcement of the
decision.
The desire to resolve conflict is a natural func-
tion of social organization. Mediation is an embodi-
ment of that desire; its cultural and historical roots
are deep. It is a practice, moreover, which has be-
come increasingly important for many American
communities in their efforts to create cooperative,
productive and healthy social environments.
In most developed societies there is a state appara-
tus for handling disputes: a formal and hierarchial
legal system is its usual form. The common law tra-
dition followed in the United States employs an
adversarial system of adjudication. Two champions
(the lawyers) meet on the field of battle (the court-
room), with one side emerging victorious and the
other vanquished. The winner is chosen by a judge
or jury with the decision based, theoretically, only
on the letter of the law. Despite risks and complexi-
ties of the legal process, increasing numbers of
Americans are using the courts to resolve their dis-
putes. This heightened demand has created a severe
backlog of cases at every level of the judicial system.
Compounding the problem is the fact that cases in
progress sometimes take years to settle; costs have
risen proportionately.
In defense of the legal edifice, one institution de-
serves at least qualified praise — small claims court.
It is used by many as means of redress for minor
civil grievances. Small claims courts feature "infor-
mality, the willingness to mediate and to concede,
the waiving of formal rules of evidence, and, above
all, the willingness to substitute goodwill and com-
promise for the adversary process" (Alper & Nich-
ols, p. xvi). Unfortunately, its limitations — the
restriction to civil cases, the minimal amounts that
may be sued for, the frequent difficulty of enforcing
judgments and the specter of delay— leave many of
its users dissatisfied.
Alienation from the traditional court system has
become widespread. Many feel that the courts dis-
pense anything but justice, and that only in the most
cumbersome and convoluted manner. Into this
breach have rushed new community modes of jus-
tice, which "do not rest on a foundation of innocent-
guilty, right-wrong, win-lose, victor-vanquished.
The foundation here is one of healing, of reconcilia-
tion of defendant with complainant as well as with
the community" (Alper & Nichols, p. xii). It is as
if many are saying "justice is too important to be
left to the justices."
In places small and large, urban and rural, all over
the country, people are involved in alternative pro-
grams such as mediation, arbitration, restitution,
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victim assistance and compensation, and citizen
panels which advise on sentencing. Community par-
ticipation in the dispute resolution process provides
perhaps a negative commentary on our legal system.
At the same time, it may be viewed as a positive
reflection on the concern and resourcefulness of
many citizens nationwide. This is not to imply that
grassroots justice has arisen overnight. As Alper and
Nichols (p. xvi) note, "the idea of community in-
volvement in the settlement of disputes is as old as
the first families of humans who came together to
form a clan. Responsibility for the resolution of con-
flict and the dispensation of justice is the cornerstone
of any society."
Even segments of the legal profession have rallied
around alternative dispute resolution. Out of a 1976
conference on the "Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice," commemorating
a 1906 address by eminent American jurist Roscoe
Pound on the same theme, 1 emerged an American
Bar Association Special Committee on Alternative
Dispute Resolution. Promotion of "dispute resolu-
tion centers" throughout the nation is the commit-
tee's charge, and it seeks to accomplish that by:
•maintaining a clearinghouse of informa-
tion on dispute resolution which is easily
accessible;
•producing publications including the
quarterly newsletter, a bibliography, and
a directory, and
•providing technical assistance on request
(Ray 1981).
Examples of specific actions taken by the commit-
tee are:
assisting the United States Justice Department
in the development of the Neighborhood Jus-
tice Center Demonstration Program and Exper-
imental Grant-in Aid legislation to stimulate fur-
ther efforts; presentation of a major National
Conference on Resolution of Minor Disputes
(Columbia Law School, May 1977); mainte-
nance of contact with almost every opera-
tional dispute resolution project in the country,
with informational data files on each; assisting
in the development of the proposed Federal
Dispute Resolution Act (PL96-190) [which
passed on February 12, 1980. Though not di-
rectly funded, under the Act, the Department
of Justice is assisting 18 states in formulating
dispute resolution legislation (id., Foreward)}
(id.).
Of course the administration of justice is hardly
the only front which has seen a recent resurgence
of citizen involvement and participation. Commu-
nity development has remained vital, even during
the "dormant 70s," through the establishment of
neighborhood associations, citizen crime-prevention
programs, health centers, community schools, food
cooperatives and community corporations for the
rehabilitation of deteriorated housing (Alper &
Nichols, p. xviii).
Though a broad scale community justice move-
ment is only now discernible in the United States,
examples of such abound throughout the world.
For instance, lay judges now participate in the
courts of many European countries, including
socialist nations. For many years now, the
Scandinavian countries have entrusted the
hearing and adjudication of children's cases to
child-welfare boards composed of elected lay
persons from the community, which take the
place of the juvenile court as we know it. The
British magistrate's courts continue to operate
in a fashion similar in many respects to our
American Justices of the Peace. We see the
emergence of special courts for labor disputes,
as in Israel.
The approach of community-justice bodies
is also being used on an increasing scale in
family courts and in the juvenile courts now
found in every major country of the world.
Housing courts and special tribunals for the
hearing of consumer complaints are two addi-
tional specialized tribunals coming into their
own.
In various ethnic groups we find modern
application of a procedure that dates back to
biblical times — for instance, the Beth Din
found in Jewish communities in the United
States, whose roots go back to the Sanhedrin
courts. Today's Gypsies, whose origins are lost
in antiquity, continue to practice their ancient
procedures for resolving disagreements be-
tween individual members of their group. The
Panchayat courts of India, supplanted during
the centuries of British colonial rule by the
common-law procedures of the home country,
are gradually replacing this alien imposition
on their historic ways of administering justice.
The socialist countries, none of which has a
common-law precedent, especially those whose
court procedures are more likely to be derived










where lay persons, whether as prosecutors, de-
fense counsels or judges, supplant the legally
schooled professionals who administer the
courts in our country (Alper & Nichols, pp.
xvii-xviii).
As appealing as community-based modes of
justice are, there are impediments to their growth.
The above-cited work of the American Bar Associa-
tion not withstanding, the institutional barriers are,
in large part, reinforced by the legal profession.
There are, of course, many attorneys supportive of
fessionals are virtually uninformed about the range
and consequences of the legal problems that plague
ordinary citizens" (id.), and the magnitude of the
obstacles becomes clear.
Impediments (e.g., the legal establishment), which
can be confronted directly are sufficiently formi-
dable. Beyond them lies the arguably more funda-
mental problem posed by a society that has evolved
from one consisting of stable, cohesive communities
with shared values, to one evidencing great mobility
and a disparity of norms within communities. Com-
a lack of incentive to
create a new legal
institution
informal dispute resolution methods. On the whole,
though, the profession has "little incentive 'to create
new legal institutions to facilitate the resolution of
disputes outside the courtrooms' " (Nader & Singer,
pp. 314-315, in Alper & Nichols, p. 243). These are
times of economic scarcity. It is difficult to find ex-
amples of economic altruism in any occupation, es-
pecially perhaps when the number of practitioners
has increased as dramatically as in law. Lawyers are
also disproportionately represented at both the state
and national legislative levels, where much can be
done to retard or foster alternatives to the legal pro-
cess. Add to this the fact that "the social distance
between the legal profession and the mass of middle-
income Americans has increased so that most pro-
munities displaying strong consensus around notions
of fairness and justice have given way to polarized
groupings bonded tenuously by a highly sophisticated
legal culture. This state of affairs complicates the pro-
cess for a transition to grassroots forms of justice.
Aside from the factors militating against the pre-
dominance of community dispute resolution, there
is an aspect of the phenomenon which creates cause
for concern. Wholesale use of the new schemes
could bring many individuals to the "bar of justice"
who might not otherwise have been ensnared. That
is, if grassroots justice is made widely available and
unqualifiedly promoted, numerous complainants
may "press charges" concerning matters that could
be worked out without institutional aid. The dispute
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handling mechanism could become overburdened;
just conflict resolution would remain illusive.
The pitfalls notwithstanding, the potential of
community-based justice is great. Throughout the
country, people are organizing to effect this goal;
their success bodes well for all of us. Clearly, if in-
dividual conflict resolutions are to command greater
respect, they must be the product of an "organic"
process embodying community values.
Mediation
In mediation, a third party facilitates agreement
between or among disputing parties. '"[TJhird parties
have, or should have, the objective of changing the
relationship between the parties from a destructively
competitive win-lose orientation to a cooperative,
collaborative problem-solving orientation" (Fisher,
p. 81). A requisite element of the process is the dis-
putants' acceptance of the mediator's intervention.
Together, the contending parties and the mediator
resolve the parties' differences and attempt to formu-
late a mutually agreeable settlement. Though medi-
ated resolutions do not legally bind the disputants,
it is anticipated that the provisions of any agreement
will be honored by virtue of the parties' mutual in-
terest in termination of the conflict.
Mediation has grown increasingly popular over
the past two decades. Creative citizens and organiza-
tions have found ways to apply it successfully in con-
texts as varied as environmental, labor-management,
budgetary and interpersonal conflicts (the latter in-
cludes domestic quarrels and squabbles involving
landlords and tenants, merchants and consumers,
and neighbors). The National Center for Dispute
Settlement of the American Arbitration Association,
the United States Department of Justice's Neighbor-
hood Justice Center and many local groups around
the country are actively pursuing the use of media-
tion (Susskind and Ozawa, p. 22).
Mediation is an appealing form of dispute resolu-
tion. The judicial system gains in many ways. Staff
(judges, police, prosecutors and the rest) are spared
the time and risks involved in cases that go to media-
tion. For example, family quarrels, which are often
mediated when the option is available, account for
approximately 20% of police deaths and approxi-
mately 40% of police injuries (Alper & Nichols,
p. 131). Jails become less crowded and the burden
of bail is eased. Perhaps most important is the
heightened respect for the legal system that fair
mediation engenders. Those who have become alie-
nated from the system may no longer equate justice
with harshness and inequality, but may come to
view the concept as connoting fairness, restitution,
peacemaking and the meeting of needs (id.). Recidi-
vism is understandably low among those whose
complaints are resolved through mediation.
The disputants are the beneficiaries of lowered
hostility, aggravation and tension when their griev-
ances are successfully resolved. In contrast, judicially
settled conflicts tend to inspire sharpened antag-
onism. Mediation occurs at the convenience of the
participants, rather than at the behest of a court.
Losses of wages and time are thereby avoided. Most
interpersonal disputes can be settled in one to three
sessions. The disputants formulate their own deci-
sion, rather than having one foisted on them by
judges and lawyers. Finally if there is a loser, pen-
ance is in the form of payments or constructive
tasks, not in the form of a criminal record.
Mediation's greatest beneficiary may be the com-
munity. For example, the demoralization resulting
from disputes which have been ignored or relegated
to the courts is ameliorated. Mediation can allay ten-
sions and possible violence which could result from
unchecked community conflict. Indirect benefits in-
clude enhancement of a community's dispute han-
dling resources, and an improvement in community
ambiance.
Mediation differs from arbitration. Though the
two share the negotiation process, the latter entails
the imposition of settlement. Acording to Meyer
(p. 164): "Mediation and arbitration have nothing in
common conceptually. One involves helping people
to decide for themselves while the other involves
helping people by deciding for them."
The Chapel Hill Dispute Settlement Center
Chapel Hill, North Carolina boasts an outstand-
ing example of a community-based mediation ser-
vice. Though the Chapel Hill Dispute Settlement
Center did not open its doors to disputants until
summer of 1979, the need for a community-based
mediation center was first articulated in the early
1970s. The center was bom from a court monitoring
program initiated by two women of the local chapter
of the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom (WILPF), at the instigation of the Interchurch
(now Interfaith) Council. The Center's organizers be-
lieved there were better ways than adjudication to








funding for a dispute
center in Chapel Hill
staffing the center
goals of the center
involving people in ongoing relationships. They felt
that court disputants were shortchanged; they also
argued that there were better uses for the judiciary's
time.
Over a period of several years, the women
amassed documentation on mediation and assessed
its appropriateness for the Chapel Hill area. An im-
portant event was a Chapel Hill visit, in 1973, by
a representative of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation (AAA) who had been instrumental in start-
ing the Dispute Settlement Center in Roxbury,
Massachusetts. Interest which later bore fruit was
piqued at that time.
In the summer of 1976, after three years of court
watching, another AAA representative visited
Chapel Hill. The result of his well-attended and
well-received talk was the successful funding of a
local dispute settlement center. The Orange County
Board of Commissioners allocated money in Octo-
ber 1976 as did the Chapel Hill Board of Aldermen
in spring 1977. The Orange County Bar Association,
contrary to the norm elsewhere, helped complete
plans for a Center.
With funding still a problem, the nascent Center
was fortunate in procuring gratis the training ser-
vices of a retiring woman attorney from the Com-
munity Relations Service of the United States De-
partment of Justice. Of the fifteen mediators trained
then, twelve remain with the Center. In the sum-
mer of 1979, key subsidies were obtained from the
North Carolina General Assembly and the United
Fund. The funds were used, in part, to hire a direc-
tor who in turn procured grants from the Reynolds
and Babcock Foundations. Though hardly well-
endowed, the Center was able to hire another staff
person, and recruit and train people to staff dispute
settlement centers across the state. These efforts
resulted in the establishment of ten additional
centers, in cities and counties around the state. New
center locations included Greensboro, Raleigh,
Durham, Winston-Salem, Charlotte and Chatham
County. Three more, in Burlington, Asheville and
Hendersonville, have opened their doors within the
past year.
At the Center's headquarters in Chapel Hill, three
staff are employed: a director, a caseworker and a
clerical worker. Six funding agencies subsidize the
Center: the towns of Chapel Hill, Carrboro and
Hillsborough, Orange County, and the Chapel Hill-
Carrboro and Orange County United Ways. As an
indication of the growing demand for the Center's
services, in fiscal year 1983, 441 cases were pro-
cessed; in the next fiscal year, 650 cases were brought
to the Center.
The Center divides its cases into two sources,
"Court" and "Community". The former includes cases
referred by the District Attorney (a longtime friend
of the Center), private attorneys, "self", the police,
judges, magistrates, the Sheriff's office and "other."
What they all have in common is that a warrant has
been issued in the matter; if it is resolved, all charges
are dropped. Cases referred range from assault
(from simple assault to assault with a deadly wea-
pon), to communicating threats, trespass, injury to
property, breaking and entering, and larceny. The
court category accounted for 53% of the Center's
cases in the 1984 fiscal year.
"Community" cases are those brought to the Cen-
ter directly by local citizens. Forty-seven percent, or
226 of fiscal 1984's cases, arose in such a manner.
The most numerous categories of such cases are
"Domestic/ Family," "Roommates," "Money Claims,"
"Neighborhood," "Landlord/Tenant," "Customer/
Business" and "Miscellaneous."
Within the last two years a Hillsborough satellite
office has opened. Its case load currently represents
about 31% of the Center's total. Interestingly
enough, Hillsborough's Court/Community mix is
the reverse of that in Chapel Hill. Whereas 65% of
the cases handled at the Chapel Hill office stem from
the community, 65% of those in Hillsborough are
subsumed under the court label. As popular as the
Center has become with the authorities in Chapel
Hill, in Hillsborough it is even more so; there, many
of the same defendants habitually move through the
judicial system on charges such as drunkenness and
barroom brawls.
The Centers' services are offered absolutely free,
though most disputants heed the fact that contribu-
tions are welcome. The only exception to the no fee
rule is for divorce and separation cases, where $10
per couple is charged for the first session and $20
for any subsequent ones. The average annual income
of the Center's disputants is under $10,000.
Fitting the overall mediator staff to the demo-
graphic profile of the community, and each case's
mediation team (Center mediators work in pairs) to
the disputants, is important to the organization.
Correspondingly, 29% of the mediators are black
and 58% are women, with ages ranging from early
20's to 80. Three male mediators were recently
added, bringing the total of all mediators to 34 (26
in Chapel Hill, 8 in Hillsborough).
The director describes the Center as having three
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main goals: help disputants find a mutually agree-
able solution while maintaining their dignity; create
a more harmonious relationship between the dispu-
tants; relieve tension in the community. The Center's
success is testimony to the effectiveness of mediated
dispute resolution. In a survey of mediations con-
ducted 4V2 years ago, 85% of Center-facilitated resolu-
tions were still intact. Also, of 172 cases commenced,
156 were successfully mediated to an agreement in
fiscal 1984 through the first three quarters of this
fiscal year.
Justice, of course, has many different meanings
to many different people. Most would probably
agree, however, that community roots are desirable
in a system of dispute resolution. This is what insti-
tutions such as the Chapel Hill Dispute Settlement
Center have to offer, and nurturing of such places
by communities seems well-advised as part of a plan
to improve morale and the quality of life.
A Role for Planners
The fact that there is little recognition of a spe-
cialty within the field called "justice planning" not-
withstanding, it arguably behooves professionals
working in all aspects of human services to foster
non-adjudicative modes of dispute resolution. In
1959, President Dwight Eisenhower said, "[Pjeople
want peace so much that one of these days govern-
ment had better get out of their way and let them
have it." Though people may well want alternatives
to litigation as badly, planners should do more than
get out of their way. They should, through demo-
graphics, court statistics, and consultation with legal
system personnel and community representatives,
endeavor to ascertain a desirable alternative dispute
resolution mechanism for the community in ques-
tion. Clearly, a planned response to frustration with
the judicial system makes far better sense than an
ad hoc one.
Postscript
Given the current funding priorities and political
interests of the Reagan administration, it is clear that
communities can expect little support from the
federal government. In the name of market-
motivated prosperity, towns and cities have been left
to drift. There seems to be little on the horizon, in
terms of federal initiatives, that promises to amelio-
rate the plight of those passed over by Reagan's
magic wand. These, arguably, are the ones with the
most to gain from the advent of community-based
dispute resolution. Not that such a program could
ever be a panacea for the woes of those who have
"fallen through the cracks," but dispute resolution
on a more human scale might serve as some sort
of lightning rod for community tensions. One senses
that, in some quarters, as straitened conditions give
rise to an escalating level of interpersonal conflict,
alienation from the court system may likewise
increase.
NOTES
1. Among Pound's concerns were the limited access
to justice caused by the delay, high costs, and in-
timidating character of the courts; the failure to
achieve substantive justice caused by the nature
of the adversary process and overriding concern
with the etiquette of the law; and the inevitable
inability of courts, guided by general legal prin-
ciples, to make decisions responsive to the subtle
variations among cases (Dubois, p. 61).
2. To date, 170 communities in forty states have estab-
lished "dispute centers" (also known as "neighbor-
hood justice centers," "citizen's dispute settlement
programs," and "night prosecutor's programs"). In
addition, more than 400 private agencies and city
government entities are involved in providing in-
formal processes to resolve citizens' problems
(Ray 1981, Foreword).
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continued from page 27
Coastal setbacks is another tenable means of devel-
opment management. Coastal setbacks can assure
protection of beach access and continued develop-
ment of the local economy in addition to reducing
flood damages. Local planners must begin to capital-
ize upon this "strategic dovetailing" of local concerns.
Higher levels of government, and particularly
states, may play an important role in assisting plan-
ners and policy makers in overcoming local political
opposition to hazard mitigation. The North Caro-
lina coastal management program now requires
coastal jurisdictions to develop hurricane mitigation
and post-storm reconstruction plans as part of their
local land use plans. This type of extra-local require-
ment deflects political opposition from the local to
the state level, and allows local supporters to point
to state requirements for justification and support
for local efforts.
The importance of particular arguments against
the use of development management is also ap-
parent from the survey. This strongly suggests the
need for local planners to be able to explicitly ad-
dress and respond to these challenges. Mitigation
proponents should not permit arguments against the
legality or constitutionality of a proposed develop-
ment management measure, for example, to jeopar-
dize its adoption and effective implementation.
Planners should be prepared to respond knowledge-
ably and authoritatively to these arguments in order
to inspire a more comprehensive and effective storm
hazards mitigation program for high risk coastal
area.
NOTES
1. See Beatley, Brower, Godschalk and Rohe, 1985,
for a complete review of the findings of the ques-
tionnaire. This report can be obtained by writing
to the Center for Urban and Regional Studies, 108
Battle Lane, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514.
2. These were communities for which an additional
wave height (under a new methodology) had
been or was in the process of being computed.
As a further check, NFIP State coordinators in
every surveyed state were asked for an indepen-
dent list of localities with V-zones in their states.
Because we felt that very small coastal localities
were unlikely to be undertaking development
management programs, localities of less than
1,000 population (as of the 1980 census) were not
surveyed.
3. A follow-up to non-responding localities allowed
us to eliminate 15 localities without coastal storm
hazards, bringing our overall survey population
to 621, and increasing the final response rate to
about 68%.
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regulations existing have been state or federally
mandated. State and federal programs need to con-
tinue to provide muscle for the adoption of hazard
mitigation policies, and should perhaps be assessed
to insure that existing programs are not providing
any additional incentives for unwise coastal develop-
ment.
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ganizations and institutions are in place to provide
additional support for worker-ownership, including
Twin Streams Education Center, Guilford College's
Democratic Management Program, and the North
Carolina Legal Services Resource Center.
Twin Streams Education Center director, Wes
Hare, runs workshops to help worker-ownership orga-
nizers learn group process skills, and develop under-
standing and support for non-hierarchic cooperative
working relationships. Twin Streams has provided
organizational support to many low-income com-
munity groups faced with job loss. Educational and
organizational development support is one aspect
of grassroots economic development that is too often
neglected by planners. This support is essential for
a successful regional worker-ownership strategy; fi-
nance packages alone cannot create nor sustain a
cooperative.
The needs of low-income cooperatives are also
met in North Carolina through the Legal Services
Resource Center. Community Economic Develop-
ment Specialist Deborah Warren coordinates legal
and educational support and provides financing and
business assistance. Ms. Warren also works with the
Center for Community Self-Help and other advo-
cates to promote legislative policy which encourages
cooperative development.
A common problem faced by worker-owned firms
is that of obtaining and developing effective and
skilled managers. Guilford College in Greensboro
currently offers an undergraduate specialization in
democratic management and employee ownership.
Courses are offered to undergraduates and co-op
members on workplace education as well as business
management. The program is a unique component
of the North Carolina worker-ownership model; one
designed to ensure that trained and committed assis-
tance will effectively guide the organization as it
develops.
Conferences
One thread that ties the various support agencies
and cooperative business together are worker-own-
ership conferences. At the 4th annual worker-owner-
ship conference at Guilford College in June 1984,
over 100 worker-owners, advocates and assistance
providers gathered for a weekend to share skills and
experiences, announce the accomplishments of
North Carolina's cooperatives, and to outline strate-
gies to meet the continuing educational, financial
and technical needs of the state's cooperatives.
Workers from eight of North Carolina's coopera-
tives: Busy Needle sewing company; The People's
Voice newsletter; Space Builders construction and
architecture design company; Service Printing Com-
pany; Community Insurance Consultants; Pascal &
Associates computer firm, and Alamance Workers
Owned Knitting hosiery company, participated.
Such conferences are a valuable part of a regional
worker-ownership strategy. They are important ex-
tensions of the training and community education
process. Conferences are also essential vehicles to
maintaining open communication between worker-
owners and support agencies. Conference recom-
mendations, moreover, provide guidelines for agen-
cy priorities.
A common dilemma encountered by North Caro-
lina's cooperatives located in rural areas is the diffi-
culty of expanding product markets. A Northeastern
North Carolina Trade Show, held June 1, 1985 in
Elizabeth City, was the first conference aimed specif-
ically to product and service promotion. The Trade
Show, sponsored by a recently formed community
development support coalition, Northeastern Re-
search and Development Group, featured educa-
tional seminars for the general public and extensive
skills-based seminars for agricultural, worker and
craft cooperative members.
The North Carolina model of worker-ownership
promotion is a coordinated system of organizations
providing a full range of educational, financial and
technical assistance. Many similar resources are
available in regions and communities suffering from
plant closings. To help mitigate the industrial re-
structuring process, planners and community orga-
nizers must design worker-ownership strategies and
develop resource organizations to provide appropriate
technical and financial assistance for their success. This
strategy is within reach of planners searching for a
job creation and retention strategy which transforms
the tragedy of plant closings into an opportunity
for economic democracy and community develop-
ment.
For information about current worker-ownership
efforts in particular states or regions throughout the
United States, contact the National Center for Em-
ployee Ownership, located in Arlington, Virginia.
For information about the Center for Community
Self-Help or the Self-Help Credit Union, call (919)
683-3016 or write to P.O. Box 3259, Durham, North
Carolina 27705.
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lify such problems. More complex are the dissimilar
expectations and assumptions of key managers in-
volved in disaster relief.
Many studies of private sector management have
found that decision makers tend to act on what they
know, sometimes to great disadvantage in the face
of changing environmental demands (Smart 1978).
New organizational planning processes have been
developed whose objective is to "surface strategic
assumptions" among the key actors in large institu-
tions (Mason and Mitroff 1981). The focus of these
procedures is not on facts and expertise, but on the
perceptions and assumptions made by individuals.
A similar process for sharing assumptions is needed
in community disaster planning — one that falls
somewhere between the seat-of-the-pants decisions
of an exercise and the boring nature of research
reports. Although these kinds of opportunities are
becoming more available at FEMAs National Emer-
gency Training Center and the State of California's
Special Training Institute, limited numbers of train-
ing facilities cannot meet this demand on a national
scale.
This is certainly an area where professional plan-
ners can play a role, although opportunities are cur-
rently scarce. The most contact that the average local
planning director has with the disaster planning pro-
cess is receiving a copy of the new plan every few
years and finding that he or she has been designated
director of emergency housing in event of a disaster.
As one planning director pointed out to us, though,
there are techniques for participation and surfacing
objectives that are planners' stock-in-trade, and these
may be applicable to the complexities of disaster
planning.
There is also a lesson in disaster planning for plan-
ners that are concerned with the difficulties of antic-
ipating remote and unfamiliar community crises. A
major transportation shutdown or water shortage
requires a number of complex actions by a variety
of agencies — many of which are unaware of how a
total response should be coordinated (see Meyer and
Belobaba 1982). Like disaster planning, the prob-
lems are not just technical but organizational in
nature. Emergency managers can borrow the plan-
ning profession's process for discussing divergent
and sometimes conflicting views of disaster prob-
lems. As planners, we can learn from the lessons of
disaster management and apply them to a much
broader range of "crisis" situations to which our
localities are vulnerable.
Notes
1. This mini-case-study is based on remarks made
by Wichita Falls former city manager at the
National Emergency Training Center on August
22, 1984.
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Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? Thomas Sowell,
William Morrow and Company: New York (1984)
and The State Against Blacks, Walter Williams, New
Press: New York (1982).
Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? by Thomas
Sowell and The State Against Blacks by Walter
Williams have very little, if anything, to do with
planning. Yet, the implications they have for plan-
ners and the planning profession are staggering. Drs.
Sowell and Williams, both conservative black econ-
omists, have directly challenged the major themes
that have long guided urban and civil rights policy,
as well as the responses of planners and others to
those policies. In the process, the two authors have
succinctly turned the conventional wisdoms of the
liberal welfare state on its head.
In his examination of civil rights legislation and
judicial history, Sowell argues that government has
been unable to translate its intentions into action.
Wilson goes even further: Government initiatives
have actually hampered the economic improvement
of the disadvantaged.
Dr. Sowell's book is not an attack on civil rights,
although he is considered a pariah within the civil
rights community. What Sowell does criticize is the
shift from civil rights as a means to insure equal op-
portunity without regard to race, creed, or gender,
to a method of enforcing equality of group results
as is manifest through affirmative action, quotas,
and comparable worth. The criticisms of legislative
and, sometimes, judicial activities that Sowell lays
out in his latest work stem, in part, from his earlier
writings which examine group results in the context
of cultural traits. His belief is that cultural habits
and traits, not 'discrimination,' are the primary cause
of disparities in group results. Legislation that
focuses only on results and not the correct causes
is doomed to fail.
Sowell challenges the statistical disparities in in-
come and employment that are used to make the
sweeping generalization of rampant discrimination.
Age, education, and geographical distribution barely
scratch the surface of group differences. They are,
Sowell contends, merely more quantifiable. What is
needed is inclusion of a far more qualitative analysis
of factors such as cultural attitudes towards educa-
tion, discipline, and work habits. An example Sow-
ell is fond of using is the disparities between West
Indian blacks who have immigrated to the U.S. and
American blacks who have migrated to the North.
Race alone cannot explain the rather stark income
and employment differences, not only among those
in the first generation, but their children and grand-
children, as well. As anathema to the civil rights vision
as that may be, Sowell's contentions and supporting
data make a strong case.
Williams is even more critical of government in-
tervention than Sowell. As his thesis states:
The government laws that have proven
most devastating for many blacks are those
that govern economic activity. The laws are
not discriminatory in the sense that they are
aimed specifically at blacks. But they are dis-
criminatory in that they deny full opportunity
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to the most disadvantaged Americans, among
whom blacks are disproportionately repre-
sented.
The specific arguments supporting his thesis are
especially convincing, especially with regard to en-
try barriers within low-skill industries. For example,
the taxicab industry should not, in theory, be out-
rageously expensive. One needs a car, a map, a
meter, and might perhaps be required to pay a small
licensing and inspection fee. Yet, in most major
metropolitian areas, entry is sharply curtailed,
especially to the economically disadvantaged. New
York, for example, requires a medallion to legally
operate a taxicab though none have been issued since
they were first granted free in the 1930s. Those me-
dallions are now worth over $60,000. The prohibi-
tive entry costs result in a very limited availability
of medallion cabs in Manhattan at rush hour or at
any time in the poorer areas of the city. Washing-
ton, D.C. on the other hand, only requires a $25
dollar license fee. The competitive dynamics of the
Washington market are plainly evident in the vast
supply and convenience of cab transportation.
Williams also makes a strong case against occupa-
tional licensing restrictions for plumbers and elec-
tricians. He argues that service costs are artificially
inflated and, more importantly, services are denied
low income residents as a result of the monopoly
behavior of occupation restrictions. A major objec-
tive of the restrictions, according to Williams, is to
restrict blacks from participating in the market. He
argues, furthermore, that by eliminating wage dif-
ferentials and floor wage rates, people are able to
make employment decisions on the basis of non-
economic factors such as racial discrimination.
If there is a weakness to the two works, it lies in
their implicit contentions concerning solutions to the
problems at hand: 1) eliminate all restrictions, and
2) reverse the offending court cases. Such simplistic
solutions neither improve economic conditions for
blacks nor advance contemporary thinking on civil
rights issues. In fact, these solutions suggest a denial
of the problem in toto. After critiquing existing civil
rights measures, the authors never attempt to offer
more effective means of government intervention.
Strategies for advancing the welfare of disadvan-
taged minorities are given cursory attention.
Whether this omission belies the authors' true con-
cern for minority welfare is debatable. Instead, what
seems apparent is a failure in the authors' argu-
ments; a failure common to welfare policy analysts
who attempt to assign principles of conservatism to
a context of a market failure.
The value of these works thus lies not in their im-
plied solutions and/or recommendations, but in
their honest critique of liberal government's inability
to resolve the wide disparities between economic
groups and between races. One may not agree with
Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? and The State
Against Blacks, but the analysis and evaluation they
present are so forceful that policy makers through-
out the country must at least appreciate their general
concerns.
Housing and Urban Development in the USSR by
Gregory D. Andrusz, SUNY Series in Urban Public
Policy, State University of New York Press, 1985.
400 pp. $14.95 paper, $39.50 cloth.
Many American planners are unfamiliar with the
profession's practice outside the continent. What
problems do planners in the United States share with
planners elsewhere? How important is governmental
structure in dictating the planners role? Are the same
trends in planning shared by other industrialized na-
tions? How are other governments dealing with
these trends?
Gregory D. Andrusz' thorough account of hous-
ing and urban development in the Soviet Union is
a proper starting place for those interested in such
international planning questions.
Planners, at one time or another, wistfully reflect
on how different things would be if we could carry
out to the fullest our carefully formulated plans. Yet,
for good or ill, we live in a society that puts a pre-
mium on individualism. Capitalism is the yardstick
by which a planner's actions are measured. Our
power is limited to the degree to which we can in-
fringe on individual rights of property ownership,
freedom of expression, and home rule. If these limits
were not in place, might we be able to implement
more effectively?
Andrusz carefully paints a picture of a country
with a completely different political system. He de-
tails the manner in which the Soviet Union has tried
to resolve the problem of housing its citizenry. The
portrait that emerges reveals some startling similari-
ties and differences to the U.S. system. For example,
in an account of the private housing sector, the
author points out that private ownership and home
building were actually encouraged by the Soviet
offering meager solutions
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government even though the practice was contrary
to the tenets of Marxism. Even more surprising, the
individuals who chose to own their homes were not
from the upper class of Russian culture, but recent
peasants and country immigrants. The cultural asso-
ciation of lower class households in privately owned
homes has placed individual home ownership in low
esteem; those of a better situation prefer high rises
close to the central city.
Perhaps the most instructive chapters involve an
assessment of urban policy effects on the develop-
ment process. Clearly, the Soviet Union is not afraid
to jump into housing with both feet. Indeed, the
very nature of socialism dictates the government's
involvement. But there is still squabbling over which
level of government is in charge of what, and which
policy should be adopted. Coordination among
agencies — long the bureaucratic battle cry of the
western world — has not been resolved in the
U.S.S.R.
The reader may be surprised at the kind of data
Andrusz' has gathered to support his conclusions.
Specifically, the book is filled with detailed cases of
housing programs and policies which realized mar-
ginal success or failed entirely. This admission of
failure is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the
study. Sensitive to the health and viability of Soviet
socialism, Andrusz' discussion seems a frank and
rather detached appraisal of the nation's progress
in housing development.
The book, though lengthy and of a scholarly
stamp, is worthy of attention by those who seek
some understanding of alternative planning pro-
cesses. The author presents a detailed analysis of
housing conditions and the effect of certain policies
on urban development, but it is left to the reader
to measure the Soviets' ultimate success. In most
cases, the author compares the Soviet housing with
conditions in the United Kingdom. For many Ameri-
cans, it is hard to appreciate these comparisons with-
out some familiarity with English town planning.
All in all, the book is not entertaining reading.
It is not meant to be. It is, however, food for thought
which will expand the international awareness of
western planners and policy analysts. In the void
of socialist planning literature, Housing and Urban
Development in the USSR is an important contribu-
tion.
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